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Abstract. Frequentist (classical) and Bayesian approaches to the construction of con-
fidence limits are compared. Various examples which illustrate specific problems are
presented. The Likelihood Principle and the Stopping Rule Paradox are discussed. The
performance of the different methods is investigated relative to the properties coher-
ence, precision, bias, universality, simplicity. A proposal on how to define error limits in
various cases are derived from the comparison. They are based on the likelihood func-
tion only and follow in most cases the general practice in high energy physics. Classical
methods are not recommended because they violate the Likelihood Principle, they can
produce inconsistent results, suffer from lack of precision and generality. Also the ex-
treme Bayesian approach with arbitrary choice of the prior probability density or priors
deduced from scaling laws is rejected.
PACS: not given
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1 Introduction
1.1 Scope of this article
The progress of experimental sciences to a large extent is due to the assignment of
uncertainties to experimental results. A measurement is incomplete and more or less
useless, unless an error interval is attributed to it. The precision of measurements has
to be known i) to combine data from different experiments, ii) to deduce secondary
parameters from it and iii) to test predictions of theories. Different statistical methods
have to be judged on their ability to fulfill these tasks.
In the language of statistics a measurement and its error are an estimate of a pa-
rameter and an estimate of a parameter interval - the confidence interval. Both are to
be inferred from a data sample or a single element drawn from a statistical distribution
which depends on that parameter. The statistical data sample collected in an experiment
is called an observation which we distinguish from a measurement.1
1For example, an observation of ten decay times of a certain particle species constitutes a sample
drawn from an exponential distribution with unknown slope parameter. The estimate of this parameter
provides the measurement of the mean life of the particle. When we perform a least square fit of some
function containing unknown parameters (which we want to measure) to experimental data points (the
observation), our probability distribution is a χ2-distribution provided that the individual deviations
of the data points follow Gaussians. The observation, - think of the reading of a meter, a drift time,
a mass distribution, a number of observed events - has no error assigned to it. The statistical uncer-
tainty is embedded in the probability distribution function describing it. Often the observation and the
measurement are numerically identical. In other cases, an observation summarizes many experimental
numbers and the measurement is the outcome of a sophisticated data analysis.
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Parameter inference is a relatively non-controversial subject, but there is still no
consensus on how to define confidence intervals for the parameters among the differ-
ent schools of statistics, represented by frequentists and Bayesians. One of the reasons
for a continuing debate between these two parties is that statistics is partially an ex-
perimental science, as stressed by Jaynes [1], and partially a mathematical discipline
as expressed by Fisher: The first sentence in his famous book on statistics [2] is “The
science of statistics is essentially a branch of Applied Mathematics”. Thus one expects
from statistical methods not only to handle all kind of practical problems but also to
be deducible from few axioms and to provide correct solutions for sophisticated exotic
examples, requirements which are not even fulfilled by old and reputed sciences like
physics.
Corresponding to the two main lines of statistical thought, we are confronted with
different kinds of error interval definitions, the classical (or frequentist) one and some
more or less Bayesian inspired ones. The majority of particle physicists intellectually
favor to the first but in practice use the second. Both methods are mathematically con-
sistent. In most cases their results are very similar but there are also situations where
they differ considerably. These cases exhibit either low event numbers, large measure-
ment errors or parameters restricted by physical limits, like positive mass, | cos | ≤ 1,
positive rates etc..
Some standard is badly needed. For example, there exist at present at least eight dif-
ferent methods to the single problem to compute an upper limit for Poisson distributed
events.
The purpose of this article is not to repeat all the philosophical arguments in favor of
the Bayesian or the classical school. They can be found in many text books for example
in Refs. [3, 4, 5] and more or less profound articles and reports [6, 7]. Further references
are given in an article by Cousins [7]. I am convinced that methods from both schools
are valid and partially complementary. Pattern recognition, noise suppression, analysis
of time series are fields where Bayesian methods dominate, goodness-of-fit techniques
are based on classical statistics.
We restrict our discussion to the evaluation of parameters of an otherwise completely
defined theory and of the confidence intervals of these parameters. They are deduced
from a comparison of the theoretical predictions to a clean, unbiassed data sample. In
this context, goodness-of-fit tests are not relevant.
The situation in physics is different from that in social, medical or economic sciences
where usually crude models have to be used which cannot be parametrized in a unique
way and thus forbid the use of a likelihood function.
In this report, the emphasis is mainly put on performance and less on the mathemat-
ical and statistical foundation. An exception is a discussion of the Likelihood Principle
which is fundamental for modern statistics. The intention is to apply the procedures to
problems to be solved in physics and to judge them on the basis of their usefulness. Even
though the challenge is in real physics cases it is in simple examples that we gain clarity
and insight. Thus simple examples are selected which illustrate the essential problems.
To judge the different definitions of confidence intervals, we introduce the following
set of criteria:
1. Error intervals and one-sided limits have to measure the precision of an experiment.
Frequentist and Bayesian confidence intervals 5
2. They should be selective (exclude wrong parameter values, powerful in classical
notation [8]).
3. They have to be unique and consistent: Equally precise measurements have equal
errors intervals. More precise measurements provide smaller intervals than less
precise measurements.
4. Subjective input has to be avoided.
5. The procedure should allow us to combine results from different experiments with
minimum loss of information.
6. The interval should provide a firm basis for decisions, like excluding a theory or
stopping data taking in an experiment.
7. The method should be as general as possible. Ad hoc solutions for special cases
should be avoided.
8. Last not least, we emphasize simplicity and transparency.
Most of these points have acquired little attention in the ongoing debate in the
physics community, and the professional statistical literature which is dominated by
applications in economics, medicine, biology and sociology hardly touches our problems.
The present discussion focuses on upper limit determinations and here especially
on the Poisson case relevant in rare or exotic particle searches. However, upper limits
should not be regarded isolated from the general problem of error assignment.
In the following section we will confront the classical method with examples which
demonstrate its main difficulties and limitations. Section 3 deals with the unified ap-
proach proposed by Feldman and Cousins [9]. In Sect. 4 we investigate methods based on
the likelihood function and discuss related problems. Section 5 is devoted to the Likeli-
hood Principle and Sect. 6 contains a systematic comparison of the methods with respect
to the issues mentioned above. Section 7, finally, concludes with some recommendations.
Part of the content of this report has been presented in Ref. [10].
We emphasize low statistics experiments. For simplicity, we will usually assume that
a likelihood function of the parameters of interest is available and that it has at most one
significant maximum. For some applications (averaging of results) not only an interval
has to be estimated but also a parameter point. Normally, the maximum likelihood
estimate is chosen. In classical approaches, the intervals do not necessarily contain the
likelihood estimate and special prescriptions for the combination of results are necessary.
In the first part of this report we will use undefined statistical terms like precision
and inconsitency and hope that they will become clear from the context in which they
are applied. We will come back to them in Sect. 5.
1.2 A first glance at the problem
Before we start to discuss details, let us look in a very qualitative way at the main
difference between a frequentist approach (respecting the coverage principle, see Sect. 2)
and methods based on the likelihood function (respecting the Likelihood Principle, see
Sect. 5).
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As a simple example we imagine an observation2 x of a variate (random variable3)
X and a probability distribution function4 (pdf) f(X|θ) depending on an unknown
parameter θ which we estimate from x. How should we select the range of parameters
which we consider compatible with the data? In Fig. 1 we display an observation x. The
two pdfs correspond to two specific parameter values θ1 and θ2.
A parameter value θ is supported by an observation x if the observation is located
where its probability density f(x|θ) is high. If we had to choose between θ1 and θ2,
intuitively we would prefer θ1, corresponding to the narrow peak because the probability
density f(x|θ1), i.e. the likelihood of θ1, is larger than the likelihood f(x|θ2) and would
include θ1 in a confidence interval with higher priority than the competitor θ2.
Classical confidence limits (CCL) rely on tail probabilities. A parameter value is
accepted inside the confidence interval if the observation is not too far in the tail of the
corresponding pdf. Essentially, the integral over the tail beyond x determines whether θ is
included. Classical methods would preferentially accept the parameter θ2 corresponding
to the wide peak, the observation being less than one standard deviation off, and not
θ1. Thus, they may exclude parameter values that correspond to higher likelihood than
those which they include.
Which of the two approaches is the better one? Given x with no additional informa-
tion we certainly would bet for θ1 with betting odds corresponding to the likelihood ratio
f(x|θ1)/f(x|θ2) in favor of θ1. However, we then clearly favor precise predictions over
crude ones. Assume θ2 applies. The chance to accept it inside a certain likelihood inter-
val is smaller than the corresponding chance for θ1. The choice based on the likelihood
function is unfair to θ2.
The classical limits exhibit an integration in the sample space, thus depending on
the probability density of data that have not been observed. Bayesians object to using
such irrelevant information. (Why should we care about the probability density f(x′|θ)
at x′ when we have observed x?) They rely on the likelihood function, transform it
into a probability density of the parameter and usually integrate the result to compute
probabilities or moments. Thus their conclusions depend on the somewhat arbitrary
choice of the parameter space5. This is not acceptable to frequentists.
The simplest and most common procedure is to avoid the integration and to define
intervals based solely on the likelihood function. It depends only on the local probability
density of the observed data and does not include subjective or irrelevant elements.
Admittedly, restricting interval estimation to the information contained in the likelihood
function - which is a mere parametrization of the data - does not permit to deduce
probabilities or confidence levels in the probabilistic sense.
2We use capital letters for variates and small letters for observations of the variate.
3For the definition of statistical terms see Ref. [11].
4In most cases we do not distinguish between discrete and continuous probability distribution func-
tions.
5We consider only uniform prior densities. There is no loss of generality, see Sect. 4.
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Fig. 1. The likelihood is larger for parameter θ1, but the observation is less then 1 st.
dev. off θ2. Classical approaches include θ2 and exclude θ1 within a 68.3% confidence
interval
2 Classical confidence limits
The defining property of classical confidence limits (CCL) is coverage: If a large number
n of experiments perform measurements of a parameter with confidence level6 α, in the
limit n→∞, the fraction α of the limits has to contain the true value of the parameter
inside the confidence limits.
In the following we show how confidence limits fulfilling the coverage requirement
can be constructed.
2.1 Visualization
We illustrate the concept of CCL for an observation consisting of a vector (x1, x2) and a
two-dimensional parameter space (see Fig. 2). In a first step we associate to each point
θ1, θ2 in the parameter space a closed probability contour in the sample space containing
an observation with probability α. (The probability contour is not necessarily a curve of
constant probability. Given α, there is an infinite number of ways to define probability
contours. Specific choices will be discussed below.) For example, the probability contour
labeled a in the sample space corresponds to the parameter values of point A in the
parameter space. The curve (confidence contour) connecting all points in the parameter
space with probability contours in the sample space passing through the actual observa-
tion x1, x2 encloses the confidence region of confidence level (C.L.) or coverage α. This
construction guarantees that all parameter values contained in the confidence region
6Throughout this article we use the generic name “confidence level” which usually is reserved for
to frequentist statistics and there is equivalent to “coverage” or “p-value”. Notations attributed to
Bayesian intervals are “credibility” or “degree of belief”. The confidence level α corresponds to the
1− α in most of the literature.
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Fig. 2. Two parameter classical confidence limit for an observation x1,x2. The dashed
contours labeled with small letters in the sample space correspond to probability con-
tours of the parameter pairs labeled with capital letters in the parameter space
Fig. 3. Two parameter classical confidence limit. The dashed probability contours la-
beled with small letters contain an estimate of the true value (capital letter) with prob-
ability α
contain the observation inside their probability contour. As a consequence, whatever
the values of the parameters realized in nature are, measurements will produce with
probability α a confidence contour which contains these parameters.
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Frequently, an observation is composed of many independent single observations
which are combined to an estimate θˆ of the parameter. Then the two plots of Fig. 2 can
be combined to a single graph (see Fig. 3).
Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate some of the requirements necessary for the construction
of a simply connected, non-empty confidence region with coverage exactly equal to α:
1. The sample space must be continuous. (Discrete distributions, thus all digital
measurements and in principle also Poisson processes are excluded.)
2. The probability contours should enclose a simply connected region.
3. The parameter space has to be continuous.
4. The parameter space should be infinite.
The restriction (1) usually is overcome by relaxing the requirement of exact coverage.
The probability contours are enlarged to contain at least the fraction α of observations.
In most cases, confidence limits with minimum overcoverage are chosen. This makes
sense only when the density of points in the sample space is relatively large.
A possibility to conserve exact coverage is to randomize the confidence belts. The
sample points are associated to the probability region of one or another parameter
according to an appropriate probability distribution. This method is quite popular in
some research fields and discussed extensively in the statistical literature but will not be
followed here. It introduces an additional unnecessary uncertainty. A procedure cannot
be optimum when decisions depend on the outcome of coin tossing.
Discrete parameter spaces can lead to empty intervals if an observation is not in-
cluded in any of the probability contours.
Confidence intervals may be located in a region forbidden by physical constraints.
Mathematical constrains, like cos ≤ 1, can produce empty intervals in the standard
classical approaches. This problem is absent in unified approaches (see Sect. 3).
Frequentists usually require that confidence intervals do not contain regions where
the parameter is not defined. Then instead of unphysical intervals empty intervals are
obtained. Unphysical intervals, however, are more informative. From the two statements
“m = 0 with 68% confidence“ and “−2eV < m < −1eV with 68% confidence”, the
second one is more valuable.
There is considerable freedom in the choice of the probability contours but to ensure
coverage their definition has to be independent of the result of the experiment. Usually,
the contours are locations of constant probability density.
2.2 Classical confidence limits in one dimension – definitions
For each possible value of the parameter θ we fix a probability interval [X1(θ), X2(θ)]
fulfilling
P (X1 ≤ X ≤ X2|θ) =
∫ X2
X1
f(X|θ)dX = α
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Table 1. Some choices for classical confidence intervals
central interval P (X ≤ X1|θ) = P (X ≥ X2|θ) = (1− α)/2
equal probability densities f(X1|θ) = f(X2|θ)
minimum size θhigh − θlow is minimum
symmetric θhigh − θˆ = θˆ − θlow
likelihood ratio ordering f(X1|θ)/f(X1|θbest) = f(X2|θ)f(X2|θbest)
one-sided θlow = −∞ or θhigh =∞
where f(X|θ) is the pdf. Using the construction explained above, we find for an obser-
vation x the confidence limits θlow and θhigh from
x1(θhigh) = x
x2(θlow) = x
The definitions do not fix the limits completely. Additional constraints have to be
added. Some sensible choices are listed in Table 1. (We only consider distributions with
a single maximum.)
2.2.1 Central intervals. The standard choice is central intervals. For a given pa-
rameter value it is equally likely to fall into the lower tail and into the upper tail of the
distribution. The Particle Data Group (PDG) [12] advocates central intervals, though
the edition from the year 2000 also proposes intervals based on the likelihood ratio or-
dering. Central intervals are invariant against variable and parameter transformations.
Their application is restricted to the simple case with one variate and one parameter.
When central intervals are considered together with a point estimation (measurement,
parameter fit), the obvious parameter choice corresponds to the zero interval length limit
(α = 0) which in most cases would not coincide with the maximum likelihood estimate.
2.2.2 Equal probability density intervals. Equal probability density intervals are
preferable because in the majority of the cases they are shorter and less biassed than
central intervals and the concept is also applicable to the multidimensional case. They
coincide with central intervals for symmetric distributions. A disadvantage is the non-
invariance of the definition under variate transformations (see Sect. 6.4).
2.2.3 Minimum size intervals. Of course we would like the confidence interval to
be as short as possible [13]. The construction of minimum size intervals, if possible at
all, is a difficult task [3, 13]. In Appendix B we illustrate how pivotal quantities can
be used to compute such intervals. Clearly, these intervals depend by definition on the
parameter choice. When we determine the mean lifetime of a particle the minimum size
limits for the lifetime will not transform into limits of the decay constant with the same
property.
2.2.4 Symmetric intervals. Often it is reasonable to quote symmetric errors relative
to an estimate θˆ of the parameter. Again this type of interval is difficult to construct
and not invariant under parameter transformations.
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2.2.5 Selective intervals. One could try to select confidence intervals which mini-
mize the probability to contain wrong parameter values [8]. These intervals are called
shortest by Neyman and most selective by Kendall and Stuart [14]. Since this condition
cannot be fulfilled for two-sided intervals independent of the value of the true parameter,
Neyman has proposed the weaker condition that the coverage for all wrong parameter
values has to be always less than α. It defines the shortest unbiassed or most selective
unbiassed (MSU) intervals7.
Most selective unbiassed intervals can be constructed [15] with the likelihood ra-
tio ordering (not to be mixed up with likelihood ratio intervals). Here the probability
contour (in the sample space) of a parameter corresponds to constant R, defined by
R(X|θ) = f(X|θ)
f(X|θbest) (1)
where θbest is the maximum likelihood estimate for a fictitious observation X . Quali-
tatively this means that preferentially those values of X are added to the probability
interval of θ where competitive values of the parameter have a low likelihood. Selective
intervals have the attractive property that they are invariant under transformations of
variables and parameters independent of their dimension. Usually the limits are close
to likelihood ratio intervals (see Sect. 4.2) and shorter than central intervals8. The con-
struction of the limits is quite tedious unless a simple sufficient statistic can be found.
In the general case, where sufficiency requires a full data sample of say 1000 events, one
has to find likelihood ratio contours in a 1000-dimensional space. For this reason, MSU
intervals have not become popular in the past and were assumed to be useful only for
the so-called exponential family [16] of pdfs where a reduction of the sample space by
means of sufficient statistics is admitted. Nowadays, the computation has become easily
feasible on PCs. However, the programming effort is not negligible.
The likelihood ratio ordering is applied in the unified approach [9] which will be
discussed in Sect. 3.
2.2.6 One-sided intervals. One-sided intervals define upper and lower limits. Here,
obviously the limit should be a function of a sufficient statistic or equivalently of the
likelihood.
2.2.7 Which definition is the best? No general answer can be given. The choice
may be different when we are interested in the uncertainty of a measurement of a particle
track or in the verification of a theory. The former case one may prefer criteria based
on the mean squared deviation of the limits from the true parameter value [18]. If
probability arguments dominate, Neyman’s MSU intervals are most attractive. Their
only disadvantage is the complicated numerical evaluation of the limits.
To simplify the discussion, in the following section (except for the first example) we
do not apply the Neyman construction but follow the more popular line using central or
7These intervals are closely related to uniformly most powerful and uniformly most powerful unbiased
tests [16]
8The likelihood ratio ordering minimizes the probability of errors of the second kind for one sided
intervals. For two-sided intervals this probability can only be evaluated using relative prior probabilities
of the parameters located at the two sides of the confidence interval. [8, 3, 17].
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Fig. 5. Likelihood ratio ordering. The likelihood ratios are equal at the limits of the
shaded probability interval
equal probability intervals. The MSU prescription will be treated separately in Sect. 3
dealing with the unified approach.
2.3 Two simple examples
Example 1 To illustrate the concept of classical confidence levels in one dimension we
consider an electron moving in a gaseous detector. The observed drift time is converted
to a distance x. The uncertainty is due to diffusion. The probability density is
f(X) =
1√
2picθ
exp
[
−(X − θ)
2
2cθ
]
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where c is a known constant. Fig. 4 shows an observation, the likelihood function and
the confidence limits for a central interval and for a MSU interval. The likelihood ratio
ordering is indicated in Fig. 5 for θ = 1. The 68.3 % probability interval covers the
region of x where the likelihood ratio is largest. The dip at X = 0 is due to the fact that
f(0|θbest) = f(0|θ = 0) = ∞. The MSU (likelihood ratio ordering) interval is shorter
than the central interval and very close to the likelihood ratio interval which is bound by
parameter values of equal likelihood (see Sect. 4.2).
We now turn to problematic situations.
Example 2 We extract the slope of a linear distribution
f(X|θ) = 1
2
(1 + θX) (2)
with −1 < X < 1. Our data sample consists of two events observed at symmetric
locations, x1, x2. From the observed sample mean s = (x1 + x2)/2 we construct the
central limits ∫ s
−1
g(s′|θhigh)ds′ =
∫ 1
s
g(s′|θlow)ds′ = 1− α
2
where g(s|θ) is the distribution of the sample mean of two observations each following
f(X|θ). For the specific result a) x1 = −0.5, x2 = 0.5, we find s = 0 and θlow = −0.44,
θhigh = 0.44 with C.L. = 0.683. If instead the result of the observation had been b)
x1 = 0, x2 = 0 or c) x1 = −1, x2 = 1 the same confidence limits would have been
obtained as in case a).
We realize that experimental data which are non-informative as in case b) can provide
stringent limits. This is compensated by relatively loose limits for informative observa-
tions as in case c) and a well defined coverage is obtained.
The reason for the poor behavior is that the first moment of the linear distribution
is not a sufficient statistic. The limits do not exhaust the experimental information.
In the quoted example the behavior can be improved also in classical statistics by
working in the two-dimensional space of x1, x2.
For a sample of size n in the above example, probability contours have to be defined in
a n-dimensional space because no simple sufficient statistic is available. The computation
of the limits becomes complex but is easily feasible with present PCs with non-negligible
programming effort.
2.4 Digital measurements
Example 3 A particle track is passing at the unknown position µ through a propor-
tional wire chamber. The registered coordinate x is set equal to the wire location xw. The
probability density
f(X|µ) = δ(X − xw)
is independent of the true location µ. Thus it is impossible to define a classical confidence
interval, except a trivial one with full overcoverage. This difficulty is common to all
digital measurements because they violate condition 1 of Sect. 2.1. Thus a large class of
measurements cannot be handled in classical statistics.
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Even frequentists use the obvious Bayesian solution (see Sect. 4) to this problem.
True values near the wire are always covered, those near the border never.
2.5 External constraints
One of the main objections to classical confidence limits is related to situations where
the parameter space is restricted by external constraints. To illustrate the problem, we
take up an often quoted example:
Example 4 A physical quantity like the mass of a particle with observations following
normal distributions is constrained to positive values. Figure 6 shows typical central con-
fidence bounds which extend into the unphysical region. In extreme cases an observation
which due to a statistical fluctuation is located in the unphysical region may produce a
90 % confidence interval which does not cover physical values at all9.
An similar situation for the standard classical method is also encountered in the
following example corresponding to the distribution of Example 2.
Example 5 For a sample of 100 events following the distribution of Eq. (2), a likelihood
analysis gives a best value for the slope parameter of θˆ = 0.92 (see Fig. 7). When we
try to compute central classical 68.3%. confidence bounds we get θlow = 0.82 and find
no upper bound inside the allowed range −1 ≤ θ ≤ 1. We cannot compute a limit
above 1 either because slopes θ > 1 are not acceptable since they would produce negative
probabilities for small values of X.
Frequentists may solve this problem by choosing asymmetric probability intervals
(excluding central and equal probability intervals) which then should be defined before
the measurement is done.
Another difficulty arises for parameters which are restricted from both sides:
Example 6 A particle passes through a small scintillator and another position sensitive
detector with Gaussian resolution. Both boundaries of the classical error interval are in
the region forbidden by the scintillator signal (see Fig. 8). The classical interval is twice
as large as the r.m.s. width. One would restrict it to the allowed region, but the error
interval is meaningless.
2.6 Classical confidence limits with several parameters
In case several parameters have to be determined, the notion of central intervals no longer
makes sense and the construction of intervals of minimal size is exceedingly complex. It
is advisable to use curves of equal probability or likelihood ratio boundaries to define
the probability region.
Very disturbing confidence intervals may be obtained in several dimensions when one
tries to minimize the size of the interval. Here, a standard example is the case of the
simple normal distribution in more than two dimension where occasionally ridiculously
tiny intervals are obtained [19].
9In classical statistics the situation is usually described by a zero-length interval. I prefer unphysical
intervals which retain more of the experimental information.
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Fig. 6. Confidence limits for a measurement with Gaussian errors and a physical bound-
ary. The left side shows 68.3% confidence intervals, the right side 90% upper limits. The
observed values of θ are −1 (top) and +1 (bottom). The labels refer to classical (c),
unified classical (cu) and Bayesian (b)
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2.7 Nuisance parameters
In most experimental situations we have to estimate several parameters but are inter-
ested in only one of them. The other parameters, the nuisance parameters, have to be
eliminated. A large number of research articles have been published on the subject. A
detailed discussion and references can be found in Basu’s work [20].
A formal way to eliminate the nuisance parameter without violating the exact cov-
erage principle is the following: For a given pdf f(X|θ, ν) where θ is the parameter of
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interest and ν the nuisance parameter. we search for a statistic Yν which is ancillary in
ν (contains no information on ν) and use the pdf f(Yν|θ) to determine the confidence
interval. Usually Yν will not be sufficient for θ and the approach is not optimum since
part of the experimental information has to be neglected. The implementation of this
approach is not straight forward. Of practical interest are the following methods.
2.7.1 Factorization and restructuring. It is easy to eliminate the nuisance pa-
rameter if the pdf factorizes in a function fν of the nuisance parameter ν and a function
fθ of the parameter of interest θ.
f(X|θ, ν) = fθ(X|θ)fν(X|ν) (3)
Then the limits for θ are independent of a specific choice of ν. If this condition is not
realized, one may try to restructure the problem looking for another parameter η(θ, ν)
which fulfills the condition.
f(X|θ, η) = fθ(X|θ)fη(X|η)
Then again fixing the new parameter η to an arbitrary value has no influence on the
confidence limits for the parameter of interest and we may just forget about it.
The following example is taken from Edwards [21].
Example 7 The absorption of a piece of material is determined from the two rates
r1, r2 registered with and without the absorber. The rates follow Poisson distributions
with mean values θ1, θ2:
f(R1, R2) =
e−(θ1+θ2)θR11 θ
R2
2
R1!R2!
We are interested in the ratio φ = θ1/θ2 which is directly related to the absorption
parameter. By a clever choice of the nuisance parameter ν
φ =
θ1
θ2
ν = θ1 + θ2
we get
f = e−ννR1+R2
(1 + 1/φ)R1(1 + φ)R2
R1!R2!
= fν(R1 +R2|ν)fφ(R1, R2|φ)
where the dependence of f on the interesting parameter φ and the function of the nui-
sance parameter ν factorize. The sum R1 + R2 which is proportional to the measuring
time, obviously contains no information about the absorption parameter. It is ancillary
and we can condition on R1 +R2. It is interesting to notice that fφ
fφ =
(1 + 1/φ)R1(1 + φ)R2
R1!R2!
is not a function of the absorption ratio R1/R2 only.
10
10An interesting application is the determination of ε′ from a double ratio of CP violating kaon
decays.
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Fig. 9. Likelihood contours for Example 8. For better visualization the discrete values
of the nuisance parameter “number of events” are connected
A lot of effort has been invested to solve the factorization problem [22]. The solutions
usually yield the same results as integrating out the nuisance parameter.
That restructuring is not always possible is seen in the following example.
Example 8 The mean decay rate γ is to be determined from a sample of 20 events which
contain an unknown number of background events with decay rate γb = 0.2. Likelihood
contours for the two parameters γ and the number of signal events are shown in Fig. 9.
There is no obvious way to disentangle the parameters.
2.7.2 Global limits. A possible but not satisfactory solution to eliminate a nuisance
parameter is to compute a conservative limit. How this can be done is indicated by the
dashed lines in the right hand graph of Fig. 2 for the two parameter case: A global
confidence interval is computed for all parameters including the nuisance parameters.
The projection of the contour onto the parameter of interest provides a conservative
confidence interval for this parameter.
Looking again at Fig. 2, we realize that by squeezing the confidence ellipse in the
direction of the parameter of interest and by stretching it in the other direction, the
confidence level probably can be maintained but a narrower projected interval could
be obtained. To perform this deformation in a consistent way such that minimum
overcoverage is guaranteed is certainly not easy. An example is discussed in Sect. 2.9.
2.7.3 Other methods. Another popular method used by classical statisticians [23,
24] to eliminate the nuisance parameter is to estimate it away, to replace it by the
best estimate. This proposal does not only violate the coverage principle but is clearly
incorrect when the parameters are correlated. The stronger the correlation between
the parameters is, the smaller the confidence interval will become. In the limit of full
correlation it will approach zero!
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2.8 Upper and lower limits
Frequently, we want to give upper or lower limits for a physical parameter. Then, of
course, we use one sided bounds.
Example 9 In a measurement of the neutrino mass the result is mˆ = (−2 ± 2) eV
with Gaussian errors independent of the true value. A 90% confidence upper limit mu is
defined classically by
0.9 =
∫
∞
mˆ
η(X|mu, 2)dX
where η denotes the normal distribution centered at mu with width 2. The upper 90%
confidence limit is mu < 0.6eV . For a measurement mˆ = (−4 ± 2) eV the limit would
be mu < −1.4 eV in the unphysical region. This is a frequently discussed problem. The
fact that we confirm with 90% confidence something which is obviously wrong does not
contradict the concept of classical confidence limits. The coverage is guaranteed for an
ensemble of experiments and the unphysical interval occur only in a small fraction of
them. Whether such confidence statements are of any use is a different story11.
2.9 Upper limits for Poisson distributed signals
In particle physics, by far the most frequent case is the calculation of upper limits for the
mean of Poisson distributed numbers, P (k|µ) = e−µµk/k! (To conform to the notations
used in physics, we do not consistently apply the convention to use capital letters for
variates.) As stated above, for discrete data the frequentist approach has to accept
overcoverage. (Remember, we do not consider randomization.) In the approximation
with minimum overcoverage the upper limit µ with confidence α for n observed events
is given by:
α =
∞∑
i=n+1
P (i|µ)
1− α =
n∑
i=0
P (i|µ)
In words, this means: If the limit corresponded to the true parameter value µ, the
probability to observe n events or less were equal to 1− α.
In the majority of search experiments no event (n = 0) is found. The classical 90%
upper confidence limit is then µ = 2.3 as shown in Fig. 10.
Now assume the true value is µ = 0. Obviously, no event will be found in repeated
experiments and the coverage is 100% independent of the nominal confidence value. It
is impossible to avoid the complete overcoverage. Published exotic particle searches are
much more often right than indicated by the given confidence level.
11Savage et al. [25]: “The only use I know for a confidence interval is to have confidence in it.”
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Fig. 10. Construction of the classical 90% confidence upper limit for zero events ob-
served. The Poisson distribution with mean 2.3 predicts zero events in 10% of the cases
2.9.1 Rate limits with uncertainty in the luminosity. A rate is obtained by
dividing the number of observed events by the luminosity or flux which usually is not
exactly known. We are only interested in the ratio, the flux is a nuisance parameter which
is to be eliminated. In Refs. [7, 23] it was claimed, that the flux uncertainty improves the
frequentist limit. This would be an inconsistent result. We apply the procedure outlined
above in Sect. 2.72 and obtain a conservative global limit.
Example 10 We observe zero events n = 0 of a certain type and measure the flux
f = 1 ± 0.05 and want to compute an upper limit for the rate. To simplify the problem
for the present purpose, we assume that the observed flux follows a Gaussian distribution
with width independent of the mean value. The event number is Poisson distributed. As
usual, we first have to construct probability contours in the sample space. Figure 11 left
shows 90% probability contours for three different combinations of true flux and true
rate. Each combination is chosen such that the observation n = 0, f = 1 is located at
the border of the probability region. In the upper plot the range for the observed flux
was selected smaller than in the lower plot. The corresponding confidence contours are
displayed at the right hand side. The global limits for the rate are indicated by a dashed
line. There is an infinite number of ways to construct the 90% probability region. Each
of them will lead to a different global limit. The construction belonging to the lower plots
obviously is superior to the first because it gives a more restrictive limit. An optimization
has not been done. In any case the limit is considerably worse than in an experiment
without uncertainty in the flux in contradiction to Refs. [7, 23].
2.9.2 Poisson limits with background. The situation becomes complex when the
experimental data contain background indistinguishable from signal. Assuming the back-
ground expectation b is precisely known the probability to find k events (background
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Fig. 11. Probability contours (left) and confidence regions (right) for a Poisson rate
with flux uncertainty. The conservative 90% upper limit of the rate is indicated by the
dashed line. The lower plots with 3 st. dev. limits in the flux provide more restrictive
90% limits than the upper 2 st. dev. flux limits
plus signal) is
W (k) =
k∑
i=0
k∑
j=1
P (i|µ)Q(j|b)δi+j,k (4)
=
k∑
i=0
P (i|µ)Q(k − i|b) (5)
with Q(j|b) the background distribution. (We sum over all combinations of background
j and signal i which add up to k events.) Usually the background also follows a Poisson
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distribution.
W (k) =
k∑
i=0
P (i|µ)P (k − i|b) (6)
= P (k|µ+ b) (7)
Then the probability to find less than or equal to n events is
1− α =
n∑
k=0
W (k)
=
n∑
k=0
P (k|µ+ b) (8)
Solving the last equation for µ, we get the upper limit with confidence α. Apparently,
for n given, the limit becomes more restrictive the larger is b.
In experiments with large background, occasionally, due to background fluctuations,
the numerical evaluation produces even negative limits or zero length limits. The limits
then do not represent the precision of the experiment which certainly is not infinite.
It is instructive to study the case where no event is observed but where background
is expected:
Example 11 In a garden there are apple and pear trees near together. Usually during
night some pears fall from the trees. One morning looking from his window, the proprietor
who is interested in apples find that no fruit is lying in the grass. If there were any, since
it is still quite dark, he would be unable to distinguish apples from pears. He concludes
that the mean rate of falling apples per night is less the 2.3 with 90% confidence level.
His wife who is a classical statistician tells him that his rate limit is too high because he
has forgotten to subtract the expected pears background. He argues, “there are no pears”,
but she insists and explains him that if he ignores the pears that could have been there but
weren’t, he would violate the coverage requirement. In the meantime it has become bright
outside and pears and apples - which both are not there - would now be distinguishable.
Even though the evidence has not changed, the classical limit has.
The 90% confidence limits for zero events observed and background expectation
b = 0 is µ = 2.3. For b = 2 it is µ′ = 0.3 much lower. Classical confidence limits are
different for two experiments with exactly the same experimental evidence relative to the
signal (no signal event seen). This conclusion is absolutely unacceptable. The classical
procedure is inconsistent in this case: The two experimental results n = 0, b = 0 and
n = 0, b = 0 warrant the same conclusion for the rate µ but lead to different interval
sizes.
Frequentists argue that in the classical approach the long-term properties of many
experiments are well defined. This is not in contradiction to the fact that there are severe
problems in the evaluation of single experiments with low statistics. We will come back
to this discussion in Sect. 6.
Feldman and Cousins consider the objections to the classical result as “based on
a misplaced Bayesian interpretation of classical intervals” [9]. It is hard to detect a
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Table 2. 90 percent confidence limits in frequentist and Bayesian approaches for n
observed events and background expectation b
n=0, b=0 n=0, b=1 n=0, b=2 n=0, b=3 n=2, b=2
standard classical 2.30 1.30 0.30 -0.70 3.32
unified classical 2.44 1.61 1.26 1.08 3.91
uniform Bayesian 2.30 2.30 2.30 2.30 3.88
Bayesian origin in a generally accepted principle in science, namely, two observations
containing the same information should give identical results. The criticism here is not
that CCLs are inherently wrong but that their application to the computation of upper
limits when background is expected does not make sense, i.e. these limits do not measure
the precision of the experiment which is the only porpose of error intervals. This is also
illustrated in the following example which is a more scientific replicate of Example 11:
Example 12 An experiment is undertaken to search for events predicted by some exotic
theory. In a pre-defined kinematic region no event is found. A search in a corresponding
control region predicts b background events. An upper limit is computed. After the limit
has been published a student discovers a new kinematical cut which completely eliminates
all background. The improved analysis produces a much less stringent classical limit than
the original one!
The 90% upper limits for some special cases are collected in Table 2. The upper rate
limit for no event found but three background events expected is negative.
2.9.3 Limits with re-normalized background. To avoid the unacceptable situ-
ation, I had proposed [26] a modified frequentist approach to the calculation of the
Poissonian limits. It takes into account that the background k has to be less or equal
to the number n of observed events. For example, if n = 1, we know for sure that
the background is either 0 or 1. Then only the probability ratio Q(1)/Q(0) is relevant,
Q(k > 1) is irrelevant for the inference of the signal from the available data. The a priori
background distribution for the condition (k ≤ n) is then:
Q′(k|b) = Q(k|b)∑n
i=1Q(i|b)
We replace Q by Q′ in Eq. (5) and obtain for the Poisson case:
1− α =
∑n
k=0 P (k|µ+ b)∑n
k=0 P (k|b)
(9)
The interpretation is: The probability 1− α to observe less or equal n events (signal +
background) for a signal mean equal µ, a background mean equal b with the restriction
that the background does not exceed the observed number is given by Eq. (9). The
resulting limits respect the Likelihood Principle (see Sect. 5) and thus are consistent.
The standard classical limits depend on the background distribution for background
larger than the observed event number. This information which clearly is irrelevant for
estimating the signal is ignored in the modified approach (Equ. 9).
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The formula 9 accidentally coincides with that of the uniform Bayesian method.
Interesting applications of the method with some variations are found in Refs. [27, 28,
29, 30].
Formula 9 has been criticized by Highland [31] because the method does not respect
the coverage requirement. This is correct, but coverage had not be claimed in my paper.
A reply is given in Ref. [32] and a further discussion can be found in Ref. [33].
In view of the unavoidable complete overcoverage for µ = 0 of all classical methods,
the moderate overcoverage of the Relation 9 which avoids inconsistencies seems to be
acceptable to many pragmatic frequentists.
2.9.4 Uncertainty in the background prediction. Often the background expec-
tation b is not known precisely. We have to distinguish two cases.
a) The pdf g(b) of b is known. Then we can integrate over b and obtain for the
conventional classical expression
1− α =
∫
g(b)
n∑
k=0
P (k|µ+ b)db
and the modified frequentist Formula 9 becomes
1− α =
∫
g(b)
∑n
k=0 P (k|µ+ b)db∫
g(b)
∑n
k=0 P (k|b)db
b) We know only the likelihood function of b for example if it is estimated from
side bands or from other measurements with limited statistics. Then b is a nuisance
parameter. Thus the methods outlined in Sect. 2.7 have to be applied. Again, I would
not support the proposal of Cousins [23], “replace the nuisance parameter by the best
estimate” since the result often violates the coverage principle, the coverage is not nec-
essarily greater than or equal to α for all values of the signal. The “global” method
(Sect. 2.72) should be used to eliminate the nuisance parameter.
2.10 Discrete parameters
For discrete parameters usually it does not make much sense to give error limits but we
would like to define relative confidence values for the parameters.
Example 13 Two theories H1, H2 predict the time of an earthquake with Gaussian
resolution:
H1 : t1 = ( 7.50± 2.25) h
H2 : t2 = (50± 100) h
The event actually takes place at time tm = 10 h. The predictions together with the
observation are displayed in Fig. 12 top. The prediction of H2 is rather vague but includes
the observation within half a standard deviation. H1 is rather precise but misses the
observation within the errors. There is no obvious way to associate classical confidence
levels to the two possible solutions. A rational extension of the frequentist methods applied
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Fig. 12. Predictions from two discrete hypothesis H1,H2 and observation (top) and log-
likelihood for H3, a parametrization of H1 and H2 (bottom). The likelihood ratio strongly
favors H1 which is excluded by the classical confidence limits
to continuous parameters would be to compare the tail probabilities of the two hypotheses.
Tail probabilities, however, are quite misleading as will be illustrated below in Example
14. They would support H2 contrary to our intuition which is clearly in favor of H1. For
this reason classical statisticians prefer to apply the Neyman-Pearson test based on the
likelihood ratio, in our case equal to 26 in favor of H1.
A similar example is analyzed in detail in an article by Jeffreys and Berger [34].
It is interesting to consider the modified example:
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Example 14 Another theory, H3(t3), depending on the unknown parameter t3 predicts
the Gaussian probability density
f(T ) =
25√
2pit32
exp
(
−625(T − t3)
2
2t43
)
for the time T . The classical confidence limits for the same observation as above, tm = 10
h, are 7.66 h < t3 <∞, is slightly excluding t1 but in perfect agreement with t2. Fig. 12
bottom shows the corresponding likelihood function and the classical confidence limit.
The probability density of our example has been constructed such that it includes
H1 and H2 for the specific values of t3 equal t1, t2. Thus the likelihood ratio f(t1)/f(t2)
is identical to that of the previous example. Let us assume that the alternative theories
H1 and H2 (which are both compatible with H3) were developed after H3. H1 which is
by far more likely than H2 could have been excluded on the basis of the observation and
the classical confidence limits.
A decisions in favor of one of two alternative hypothesis, according to the Neyman-
Pearson Lemma should be based on the likelihood ratio only. Here, frequentists usually
do not consider the full sample space and do not compute the coverage for the two
hypotheses.
What happens, when we add to the first two discrete parameter values a third, forth,
fifth parameter and so on? We may construct a transition from the discrete case to the
continuous one by adding more and more hypotheses. At a certain point, frequentists
would switch from characterizing the situation by likelihood ratios to using coverage
intervals.
The two classical concepts, confidence limit and Neyman-Pearson test, lack a com-
mon basis. Frequentists would argue that there are two different methods for two differ-
ent goals. The question is then: What are there two different goals exactly and why are
we interested in the likelihood ratio in one situation and in coverage in the other?
3 Unified approaches
Feldman and Cousins [9] have proposed a new approach to the computation of classical
confidence bounds which avoids the occurrence of non-null (or alternatively non-physical)
confidence regions, one of the most problematic features of the conventional classical
confidence limits. In addition it unifies the two procedures “computation of confidence
intervals” and “computation of one-sided confidence limits”. The unified treatment has
already been adopted by several experiments and is recommended by the Particle Data
Group [12]. However, as shown below, it has serious drawbacks.
3.1 Basic ideas of the unified approach
The unified approach has two basic ingredients:
1) It unifies the two procedures “computation of a two-sided interval” and “compu-
tation of an upper limit”. The scientist fixes the confidence level before he looks at the
data and then the data provide either an error interval or a lower or upper limit, de-
pending on the possibility to obtain an error interval within the allowed physical region.
The method thus avoids a violation of the coverage principle which is obvious in the
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commonly used procedure where the selection of one or two sided bounds is based on
the data and personal prejudice.
2) It uses the likelihood ratio ordering principle (see Sect. 2.2) which has the at-
tractive property to be invariant against transformations of the sample space variables.
In addition, unphysical intervals or limits are avoided. Here the trick is to require that
the quantity θbest of relation (1) is inside the range allowed by the laws of physics. As
discussed in Sect. 2, the likelihood ordering corresponds to MSU intervals and is an old
concept. What is new is the application to cases where the parameter range is restricted
by external bounds.
In practice, the main impact of this method is on the computation of upper limits.
Experiments have “improved” their upper limits by switching to the unified approach
[35, 36].
The new approach has attractive properties, however, all those problems like the
treatment of nuisance parameters which are intrinsic to the philosophy of classical statis-
tics remain unsolved.
Kendall and Stuart [37] write in connection with the likelihood ratio ordering (nota-
tion slightly modified) “For the likelihood ratio method to be useful ... the distribution
of R(X|θ) has to be free of nuisance parameters.”
Additional complications are introduced by the requirement that θbest has to be inside
the allowed parameter space [10]. Pathological cases have also been presented by Punzi
[38] and Bouchet [39].
3.2 Difficulties with two-sided constraints
One of the advantages of the unified approach is the improved handling of physical
bounds. This is shown in Fig. 6 for a Gaussian with external bounds. The unified intervals
avoid unphysical values of the parameter but unfortunately this problem persists when
a parameter is bounded from both sides.
Example 15 We resume Example 6, Fig. 8. A particle track is measured by a combina-
tion of a proportional wire chamber and a position detector with Gaussian resolution. Let
us assume an observation xˆ = 0 of a parameter µ with a physical bound −1 < µ < 1 and
a Gaussian resolution of σ = 1.1. The Bayesian r.m.s. error computed by integrating the
likelihood function is 0.54. Since there are two boundaries the procedure applied in Ex-
ample 4 no longer works. Requiring a 68.3% confidence level produces at the same time
an upper and a lower limit. It is impossible to fulfill the coverage requirement, except if
the complete range of x is taken (complete coverage).
A similar example is discussed in the classical book by Kendall and Stuart [40]:
“It may be true, but would be absurd to assert −1 ≤ µ ≤ +2 if we know already that
0 ≤ µ ≤ 1. Of course we could truncate our interval to accord with the prior information.
In our example, we could assert 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1: the observation would have added nothing
to our knowledge.”
3.3 External constraint and distributions with tails
Difficulties occur also for location parameters with one-sided physical bounds when the
resolution function has tails. In the unified approach, unphysical confidence intervals
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Fig. 13. Probability distribution (top) and corresponding likelihood ratio (center) for
the superposition of two Gaussians in the unified approach. Since regions are added to
the probability interval using the likelihood ratio as an ordering scheme, disconnected
intervals (shaded) are obtained. A Breit-Wigner pdf shows a similar behavior (bottom)
are avoided by adding preferentially those parts of the sample space to the probability
region which are located in the unphysical region. However, the corresponding likelihood
ratio ordering may produce disconnected probability regions and consequently also dis-
connected confidence intervals if the pdf decreases slowly in the unphysical part of the
sample space. Disconnected confidence intervals do not make sense for measurements
following smooth probability distributions with a single maximum.
Example 16 We consider the superposition of a narrow and a wide Gaussian. (It is
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quite common that distributions have non-Gaussian tails.)
f(X|µ) = 1√
2pi
{
0.9 exp
(−(X − µ)2/2)+ exp (−(X − µ)2/0.02)} (10)
with the additional requirement of positive parameter values µ. This pdf is shown in
Fig. 13 top for µ = 1. The likelihood ratio for an observation x = 1 is displayed in the
center of Fig. 13. Adding X-values to the probability interval according to the likelihood
ratio produces disconnected probability interval regions which do not make sense. It is
impossible to construct simply connected confidence intervals.
The same difficulty arises for the Breit-Wigner distribution, where again the likeli-
hood ratio is shown in Fig. 13 bottom for an observation x = 1.
In fact, it is only a very special class of distributions for which we can guarantee
that we do not get disconnected confidence intervals. For pdfs depending on |X− θ| like
those we just discussed, disconnected probability intervals are avoided if the likelihood
ratio R = f(X|θ)/f(X|θbest) decreases monotonically from the center of the distribution
towards the tails. The requirement dR/dX < 0 for X > θ is equivalent to
d
dX
ln f(X|θbest) > d
dX
ln f(X|θ)
d
dX
ln f(X|θ +∆) > d
dX
ln f(X|θ)
d
dX
ln f(X −∆|θ) > d
dX
ln f(X|θ)
d
dX
ln f(X|θ)− ln f(X −∆|θ)
∆
< 0
where we have set ∆ = θbest − θ. All values of ∆ can occur. In the limit ∆→ 0 we get
d2 ln f
dX2
< 0
Thus, the problem is absent for pdfs with convex logarithms. Integrating the last
relation twice, we find that near physical boundaries the unified approach in the present
form is essentially restricted to Gaussian like pdfs.
3.4 Artificial correlations of independent parameters
Since the confidence intervals are defined through coverage, one has to be careful in the
interpretation of error bounds near physical boundaries: Artificial correlations between
parameters are introduced.
Example 17 The uncorrelated variates X, Y follows a two dimensional Gaussian. The
two variances are equal and known, the center µx, µy is unknown. Figure 14 shows
schematically the circular probability contour for the conventional classical approach and
the modified contour of the unified approach which has shrunk in X due to the bound-
ary in Y . An observation x, y near the boundary will lead to confidence contours which
reflect this modified shape. The error for µx shrinks due to the unphysical µy region.
Probably one would try to avoid the artificially introduced correlation and treat
the two coordinates independently but even a slight real correlation would inhibit this
possibility.
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Fig. 14. Probability contours (schematic) for a two-dimensional Gaussian near a bound-
ary in the unified approach
3.5 Several bounded parameters
The prescription to restrict the value θbest to the physically allowed region is easily ex-
tended to the situation where we have to determine confidence limits for several bounded
parameters. However, this case has not been studied and very strange results might
be obtained in some cases. Feldman and Cousins [9] apply their method to a two-
dimensional toy model and show that the method works technically. A thorough study
is still missing.
3.6 Upper Poisson limits
Table 2 contains 90% C.L. upper limits for Poisson distributed signals with background.
For the case n = 0, b = 3 the uniform approach avoids the unphysical limit of the
conventional classical method but finds a limit which is more restrictive than that of
a much more sensitive experiment with no background expected and twice the flux!
Compared to the conventional approach, the situation has improved - from a Bayesian
point of view - but the basic problem is not solved and the inconsistencies discussed in
Sect. 2.9 persist.
Figure 15 compares the coverage and the interval lengths of the unified method with
the Bayesian one with uniform prior (to be discussed below). The nominal coverage is
90%. Unavoidably for µ = 0, b = 0 there is maximum over-coverage and in the range
0 ≤ µ ≤ 2.2 the average coverage is 96%.
3.7 Restriction due to unification
Let us assume that in a search for a Susy particle a positive result is found which
however is compatible with background within two standard deviations. Certainly, one
would prefer to publish an upper limit to a measurement, contrary to the prescription
of the unified method. The authors defend their method arguing that a measurement
with a given error interval always can be interpreted as a limit - which is true.
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Fig. 15. Coverage and confidence interval width for the unified approach and the
Bayesian case. The Bayesian curves are computed according to the unification prescrip-
tion
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Fig. 16. Likelihood function for zero observed events and 90% confidence upper limits
with and without background expectation. The labels refer to [9] (f), Bayesian (b), [41]
(g) and [42] (r)
3.8 Alternative unified methods
Recently modified versions of the unified treatment of the Poisson case have been pub-
lished [41, 42, 38, 43, 44].
The results of Giunti [41] are nearer to the uniform Bayesian ones, but wider than
those of Feldman and Cousins.
Roe and Woodroofe [42] re-invented the method proposed by myself ten years earlier
[26] and added the unification principle. The authors introduced the concept of “ancil-
lary variable” for the background and condition on its upper limit given by n. Since this
number obviously is not an ancillary statistic, their concept fails to provide the required
coverage properties. In their second paper [43] they present a Bayesian method which is
claimed to have good coverage properties, but this is also true for the standard Bayesian
approach.
Punzi [38] modifies the definition of confidence intervals such that they fulfill the
Likelihood Principle. This approach is in some sense attractive but the intervals become
quite wide and it is difficult to interpret them as standard error bounds.
Ciampolillo [45] uses the likelihood statistic which maximizes the likelihood inside
the physically allowed region as estimator. In most cases it coincides with the parameter
or parameter set which maximizes the likelihood function. Usually, the maximum likeli-
hood estimator is not a sufficient statistic and thus will not provide optimum precision
(see Example 2). Similarly, Mandelkern and Schulz [44] use an estimator confined to
the physical domain. Both approaches lead to intervals which are independent of the
location of the observation within the unphysical region. I find it quite unsatisfactory
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that two observations following Gaussian pdfs x1 = −0.1 and x2 = −2 with the bound
µ > 0 and width σ = 1 yield the same confidence interval. Certainly, our betting odds
would be different in the two cases.
In summary, from all proposed unified methods only the Feldman/Cousins approach
has a simple statistical foundation. Zech/Roe/Woodroofe’s method is not correct from
a classical frequentist point of view, Punzi’s method is theoretically interesting but not
suited for error definitions, and the other prescriptions represent unsatisfactory ad-hoc
solutions.
The Figs. 16 and 17 compare upper limits, coverage and interval lengths for some
approaches for b = 0 and b = 3. (Part of the data has been taken from Ref. [42].) The
likelihood functions for n = 0, b = 0 and n = 0, b = 3 are of course identical up to
an irrelevant constant factor. Apparently, Feldman and Cousins avoid under-coverage
while the other approaches try to come closer to the nominal confidence level but in
some cases are below. The interval widths are similar for all methods.
4 Likelihood ratio limits and Bayesian confidence intervals
4.1 Inverse probability
Bayesians treat parameters as random variables (see also Appendix A). The combined
probability density f(X, θ) of the variate X and the parameter θ can be conditioned on
the outcome of one of the two variates using Bayes theorem:
f(X, θ) = fx(X|θ)piθ(θ) = fθ(θ|X)pix(X)
fθ(θ|X) = fx(X|θ)piθ(θ)
pix(X)
(11)
where the functions pi are the marginal densities. The density piθ(θ) in this context usu-
ally is called prior density of the parameter and gives the probability density for θ prior
to the observation x of X . For a given observation x the conditional density fx can be
identified with the likelihood function. The marginal distribution pix is just a multiplica-
tive factor independent of θ and is eliminated by the normalization requirement.
fθ(θ|x) ∝ L(x, θ)piθ(θ)
fθ(θ|x) = L(x, θ)piθ(θ)∫∞
−∞
L(x, θ)piθ(θ)dθ
(12)
The prior density piθ has to guarantee that the normalization integral is finite.
In the literature fθ often is called inverse probability to emphasize the change of role
between X and θ.
The relation (12) contains one parameter and one observation, but x can also be
interpreted as a “vector” (x1, x2, ..), a set of individual observations of independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) variates, following the same distribution f0(X|θ)
f(X|θ) =
∏
i
f0(Xi|θ)
or any kind of statistic and θ may be a set of parameters.
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Fig. 17. Top: Coverage as a function of the Poisson rate for expected background b = 3.
The nominal coverage is 90%. The labels refer to [9] (f), Bayesian (b), [41] (g) and [42]
(r). Bottom: Interval length as a function of the observed number of events
4.2 Interval definition
4.2.1 Bayesian intervals. Having the probability density of the parameter in hand,
it is easy to compute mean values, r.m.s. errors or probabilities for upper or lower bounds
(see Fig. 18).
There is again some freedom in defining the Bayesian limits. One possibility would be
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Fig. 18. Likelihood ratio limits (left) and Bayesian limits (right)
to quote the mean and the variance of the parameter, another possibility is to compute
intervals of a given probability12. The first possibility emphasizes error propagation, the
second is better adapted to hypothesis testing. In the latter case, the interval boundaries
correspond to equal probability density of the parameter13 (equal likelihood for a uniform
prior). Again a lack of standardization is apparent for the choice of the interval.
4.2.2 Likelihood ratio intervals. Since the likelihood function itself represents the
information of the data relative to the parameter of interest and is independent of the
problematic choice of a prior it makes sense to publish this function or to parametrize
it. Usually, the log-likelihood, in this context called support function [46] or support-by-
data an expression introduced by Hacking [47], is mathematically more convenient than
the likelihood function itself.
For continuous parameters, usually likelihood limits are given. For a single parameter,
the two equivalent conditions
Lmax/L(θlow) = Lmax/L(θhigh) = e
∆ (13)
lnL(θlow) = lnLmax −∆ = lnL(θhigh) (14)
where Lmax is the maximum of the function in the allowed parameter range θmin < θ <
θmax, fix a likelihood ratio interval θlow < θ < θhigh (see Fig. 18). The values ∆ = 0.5 and
∆ = 2 define one and two standard deviation likelihood limits (support intervals). In the
one parameter case limit where f(X) is a Gaussian (the width being independent of the
parameter) these bounds correspond to classical.C.Ls. of 0.683 and 0.954 confidence.
The one-dimensional likelihood limits transform into boundaries in several dimen-
sions. For example for two parameters we get the confidence contour in the θ1 − θ2
plane.
lnL(x; θ1, θ2) = lnLmax −∆
12In the literature the expression degree of belief is used instead of probability to emphasize the
dependence on a prior density. For simplicity we will stick to the expression confidence level.
13Central intervals are wider and restricted to one dimension.
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The value of ∆L is again equal to 0.5 (2) for the 1st. dev. (2 st. dev.) case. The contour
is invariant under transformations of the parameter space.
Upper Poisson limits are usually computed from Bayesian probability intervals.
D’Agostini [48] emphasizes the likelihood ratio as a sensible measure of upper limits, for
example in Higgs searches. In this way the dependence of the limit on the prior of the
Bayesian methods is avoided.
4.3 Problems with likelihood ratio intervals
Many of the situations where the classical methods find difficulties are also problematic
for likelihood ratio intervals.
• The elimination of nuisance parameters is as problematic as in the frequentist
methods.
• Digital measurements have constant likelihood functions and cannot be handled.
• The error limits for functions with long tails (like the Breit-Wigner pdf) are mis-
leading.
• When the likelihood function has its mathematical maximum outside the physical
region (Lmax is then at the edge of the physical region), the resulting one-sided
likelihood ratio interval for ∆ = 0.5 may be unreasonably short.
• The same situation occurs when the maximum is near the border of the allowed
sample space.
A frequently discussed example is:
Example 18 The width θ of a uniform distribution
f(X|θ) = 1
θ
; 0 < X < θ
is estimated from n observations xi. The likelihood function is
L = θ−n; θ ≥ xmax
with a 1/
√
e likelihood ratio interval of xmax < θ < xmaxe
1/(2n) which for n = 10 is only
about half of the classical and the Bayesian widths. (This example is relevant for the
determination of the time zero t0 from a sample of registered drift times.)
We will come back to likelihood ratio intervals in sections 6 and 7. In the following
we concentrate on the Bayesian method with uniform prior but free choice of parameter.
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4.4 The prior parameter density and the parameter choice
The Bayesian method would be ideal if we knew the prior of the parameter. Clearly the
problem is in the prior parameter density and some statisticians completely reject the
whole concept of a prior density. The following example demonstrates that at least in
some cases the Bayesian way is plausible.
Example 19 An unstable particle with known mean life τ has decayed at time θ. We
are interested in θ. An experiment with Gaussian resolution s, η(T |θ, s) finds the value
t. The prior density pi(θ) for θ is proportional to exp(−θ/τ). Using (12) we get
fθ(θ) =
η(t|θ, s)e−θ/τ∫
∞
0
η(t|θ, s)e−θ/τdθ
However, there is no obvious way to fix the prior density in the following example:
Example 20 We find a significant peak in a mass spectrum and associate it to a so far
unknown particle. To compute the probability density of the mass M we need to know
the a priory mass density pi(M).
There are all kind of intermediate cases:
Example 21 When we reconstruct particle tracks from wire chamber data, we always
assume a flat track density (uniform prior) between two adjacent wires. Is this assump-
tion which is deduced from experience justified also for very rare event types? Is it valid
independent of the wire spacing?
In absence of quantitative information on the prior parameter density, there is no
rigorous way to fix it. Some Bayesians use scaling laws to select a specific prior [5]
or propose to express our complete ignorance about a parameter by the choice of a
uniform prior distribution (Bayes’ Principle). An example for the application of scaling
is presented in Appendix C. Some scientists invoke the Principle of Maximum Entropy
to fix the prior density [49].
I cannot find convincing these arguments, but nevertheless I consider it very sensible
to choose a flat prior as is common practice. This attitude is shared by most physicists
[50]14. I do not know of any important experimental result in particle physics analyzed
with a non-uniform prior. In Example 21 it is quite legitimate to assume a uniform track
density at the scale of the wire spacing.
Similarly for a fit of the Z0-mass there are no reasons to prefer a priori a certain
mass within the small range allowed by the measurement. This fact translates also into
the quasi independence of the result of the parameter selection. Assuming a flat prior
for the mass squared would not noticeably alter the result.
The constant prior density is what physicists use in practice. The probability density
is then obtained by normalizing the likelihood function15. The obvious objection to this
recipe is that it is not invariant against parameter transformations. A flat prior of θ1 is
14A different point of view is expressed in Refs. [7, 51].
15Normalizing the likelihood function means technically L(θ)/
∫
∞
−∞
L(θ)dθ and is the Bayesian pdf
for θ obtained from a uniform prior pi(θ) = const.
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incompatible with a flat prior of θ2 unless the relation between the two parameters is
linear since we have to fulfill
pi1(θ1)dθ1 = pi2(θ2)dθ2
The formal contradiction often is unimportant in practice unless the intervals are so
large that a linear relation between θ1 and θ2 is a bad approximation.
One should also note that fixing the prior density to be uniform does not really
restrict the Bayesian choice: There is the additional freedom to select the parameter.
A parameter θ1 with arbitrary prior can be transformed into a parameter θ2(θ1) with a
constant prior density. Thus, for example, a physicist who would like to choose a prior
density piτ ∝ 1/τ 2 for the mean life τ is advised to use instead the decay parameter
γ = 1/τ with a constant prior density. In the following we will stick to the convention
of a uniform prior but allow for a free choice of the parameter.
The convention to use uniform prior pdfs is convenient because it simplifies the
presentation of results. It is enough to state the parameter and the interval. The scientist
has to select a parameter space for which he has no strong a priori preference for specific
parameter values.
An example where the parameter choice matters is the following:
Example 22 The decay time of a particle is recorded. The single observation t is used
to estimate its mean life τ . Using a flat prior we find the posterior parameter density
f(τ) ∼ 1
τ
e−t/τ
which is not normalizable.
Thus a flat prior density is not always a sensible choice for an arbitrarily selected
parameter. In the preceding example the reason is clear: A flat prior density would
predict the same probability for a mean life of an unknown particle in the two intervals
0 < τ < 1ns and 1s < τ < 1s+ 1ns which obviously is a fairly exotic choice. When we
choose instead of the mean life the decay constant γ with a flat prior, we obtain
f(γ) =
γe−γt∫
∞
0
γe−γtdγ
= t2γe−γt
The second choice is also supported by the more Gaussian shape of the likelihood
function of γ as illustrated in Fig. 19 for the observation of two decays. The figure gives
also the distributions of the likelihood estimators to indicate how frequent they are.
One possible criterion for a sensible parameter choice is the shape of the likelihood
function. One could try to find a parameter with approximately Gaussian shaped like-
lihood function and use a constant prior.
We resume the digital position measurement by a proportional wire chamber (Exam-
ple 21). The likelihood is constant inside the interval allowed by the measuring device.
It does not make sense to transform the parameter to obtain a Gaussian shape. Here it
is common practice to use a constant prior probability and to associate to the central
value the r.m.s. error interval ±2mm/√12 of a flat probability distribution.
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Fig. 19. Distribution of the max. likelihood estimates for the mean life (a) and the decay
constant (b) for two decays. The corresponding likelihood functions are shown in (c) and
(d) for estimates equal to one
4.5 External constraints
Bayesians account for external constraints by using vanishing prior functions in the un-
physical region which is equivalent to normalizing the parameter density to the relevant
parameter interval as is illustrated in Fig. 20. The same procedure is applied to the
Gaussian of Example 4 in Fig. 6.
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Fig. 20. Likelihood function renormalized to the physically allowed region. The con-
struction of the upper limit is indicated
4.6 Several parameters and nuisance parameters
The extension of the Bayesian scheme to several parameters is straight forward. Nuisance
parameters can be integrated out. To do so, in principle, we have to choose the full prior
density of all parameters.
f(θ|x) ∼
∫
L(θ, φ, x)pi(θ, φ)dφ
Even in case the likelihood function of the parameters factorizes we cannot separate the
parameters without making the additional assumption that also the prior density can
be written as a product of independent priors.
Since we have decided to accept only uniform prior densities the difficulty is absent.
4.7 Upper and lower limits
Bayesians compute the upper limits µ from the tail of the inverse probability density
which for a constant prior is the normalized likelihood function.
α =
∫
∞
µ
L(µ′)dµ′/
∫
∞
−∞
L(µ′)dµ′ (15)
For the Poisson process with Poisson distributed background we get the limit µ from
α =
∫
∞
µ
P (n|µ′ + b)dµ′ = 1−
∑n
i=0 P (i|µ+ b)∑n
i=0 P (i|b)
which is identical to the frequentist formula with normalization to possible background
[26], and, for zero background expectation to the classical limit. Figure 21 compares the
classical 90% confidence limits to the Bayesian ones for 4 expected background events as
a function of the number n of observed events. The width of the horizontal bins indicates
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Fig. 21. 90% c.l. upper limits in the Poisson case for the classical and the Bayesian
approach. The expected background is 4, the parameter n is the number of observed
events. The unphysical limits of the classical approach for n < 2 are suppressed. The
integrated probability corresponds to the true value µ = 0
the frequency of the occurrence of a certain number n of observed events for the specific
case where µ = 0. The unphysical limits of the classical approach for n = 0, 1 occur in
about 9% of the cases.
It is easy to generalize the Bayesian procedure for arbitrarily distributed background
with the probability Q(m|b) to obtain m background events for a given expectation b.
L(µ) =
n∑
i=0
P (i|µ)Q(n− i|b)
The likelihood function has to be inserted in Equ. 15. The background parameter b may
follow another distribution g(b)
L(µ) =
n∑
i=0
P (i|µ)
∫
∞
−∞
Q(n− i|b)g(b)db
The latter expression is useful if the background mean has an uncertainty for example
when it is deduced from the sidebands of an experimental histogram.
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4.8 Discrete parameters
The discrete case is automatically included in the continuous one if we allow for δ-
functions. The probability for hypothesis i is given by
Pi =
Lipii∑
i Lipii
where the likelihoods are multiplied by the prior probabilities. The confidence level for an
interval translates into the confidence attributed to a hypothesis. Usually, one would set
the priors all equal and obtain the simple likelihood ratio used in Example 13. Another
example (quoted in Ref. [7]) follows:
Example 23 The Mark II collaboration reported a measurement of the number of neu-
trinos Nν = 2.8 ± 0.6 which is slightly lower than the known number of three neutrino
generations. They take advantage of the negative fluctuation of their result and derive
from the tail distribution the 95% classical confidence limit Nν < 3.9. A Bayesian would
quote the ratio of the likelihoods for the hypothesis of three and four neutrino species,
L(3|2.8 ± 0.6)/L(4|2.8 ± 0.6) = 7.0 (assuming Gaussian distributed errors) which in
principle could be multiplied by prior probabilities. The difference between these results
is considerable: The classical tail limit indicates a factor 20 in favor of the three neutrino
hypothesis. The likelihood ratio certainly is better suited to describe the experimental sit-
uation.
5 The Likelihood Principle and information
In this article I hope to convince the reader that all parameter and interval inference
should be based solely on the likelihood function. To this end we start with a discussion
of the Likelihood Principle which plays a key role in modern statistics.
5.1 The Likelihood Principle
Many statisticians (Fisher, Barnard, Birnbaum, Hacking, Basu and others) have con-
tributed to the development of the Likelihood Principle (LP). References, derivations
and extensive discussions are found in a summary of Basu’s articles [53] and the book
by Berger and Wolpert [52].
We assume that our observation x follows a given probability density f(X|θ) with
unknown parameter θ.
The Likelihood Principle states:
The information contained in an observation x with respect to the parameter θ is
summarized by the likelihood function L(θ|x).
In other words, L(θ|x) of the actual observation is all what matters for the parameter
inference.
A multiplicative constant c(x) in L (corresponding to an additive constant not de-
pending on θ in the log-likelihood) is irrelevant. Methods not respecting the LP – infer-
ence not based on L alone – do not use the full information contained the data sample16.
16Information as used here is not to be mistaken with the technical meaning given to this word by
Fisher [54].
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The LP asserts that the information relative to a parameter is identical in two exper-
iments with proportional likelihood functions and identical parameter space, even when
the pdfs are different (see Stein’s example below). Parameter inference should be based
on the likelihood function alone.
The Poisson problem, with zero events observed but background expected, is a nice
example illustrating the LP. The likelihood function is independent of the background
expectation but the pdf depends on it. According to the LP, the information relative to
the signal is independent of the background expectation. Classical confidence intervals
are in conflict with the LP, likelihood ratio limits and Bayesian intervals are in agreement
with it.
The LP relies on the strict validity of the probability density which is used, a condi-
tion usually fulfilled in exact sciences. It is less useful in social, economical and medical
applications where only approximative theoretical descriptions are available. Methods
based on the likelihood function often are very sensitive to unknown biasses, background
and losses.
The LP can be derived [52, 53] from the Sufficiency Principle:
If T ′ = T (x′1, x
′
2, ...x
′
n) is a sufficient statistic
17 in an experiment and if T ′ = T ′′ =
T (x′′1, x
′′
2, ...x
′′
n) the same value is obtained in another experiment, both experiments fol-
lowing f(X1, X2, ...Xn|θ) the evidence for θ is the same in both experiments.
and the Weak Conditioning Principle (in sloppy notation):
Performing the mixed experiment where randomly one of the experiments E1 and E2
is selected is equivalent to performing directly the selected experiment.
We illustrate the Weak Conditioning Principle with a simple example: An experi-
ment E1 has two position sensitive detectors D1 with low resolution and D2 with high
resolution. The efficiency of D2 is low. When D2 has seen a particle, only the measure-
ment of D2 is used. For this specific measurement the experiment with both detectors
is equivalent to the experiment E2 with only one detector D2. The Weak Conditioning
Principle requires that inference of the position should be the same in both experiments.
The presence of a detector which is not used should not matter.
However, there exist reservations against the proof of the LP and some prominent
statisticians do not believe in it. Barnard and Birnbaum, originally promoters of the LP,
ultimately came close to rejecting it or to strongly restrict its applicability. One of the
reasons for rejecting the LP is its incompatibility with classical concepts. We will come
back to some of the most disturbing examples. Other criticism is related to questioning
the Sufficiency Principle and to unacceptable consequences of the LP in specific cases
[55, 56, 57, 58]. Most statisticians, frequentists and Bayesians, usually accept that the
likelihood function summarizes the experimental information but some statisticians like
Barnard feel that parameter inference should include system information like the pdf
or, if relevant, the condition applied to stop data taking (see below).
Independent of the formal proof, the LP can be justified by simple arguments.
The LP almost follows from the optimal performance of the likelihood ratio test for a
discrete hypothesis. It is hardly avoidable if the concept of a prior probability density for
the parameter is accepted. Then Bayes’ theorem can be used to deduce the probability
density g(θ|x) of the parameter θ conditioned on the outcome x of an experiment (see
17A statistic t is sufficient for a parameter θ, if the distribution of a sample given T does not depend
on θ.
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Eq. (11))
g(θ|x) ∼ L(θ|x)pi(θ) (16)
Bayes’ theorem is a simple consequence of probability calculus and accepted by all
statisticians. For known prior information pi(θ), the distribution g(θ|x) contains all we
know about θ. We can compute the expectation value for the mean, all other moments
and probabilities for arbitrary intervals18. Since pi does not depend on x the full sample
information is contained in L. If we accept that L(θ|x) contains the full sample infor-
mation about θ regardless of the known prior, then we also have to accept that if pi(θ)
is unknown, all information is contained in the likelihood function.
There are two possibilities to escape these conclusions based on Bayes’ Theorem:
• We can deny the existence of the prior density. In deed, at first glance it is not
obvious what meaning we should attribute for example to a prior density of the
muon neutrino mass but to derive LP it is not necessary to assume that the prior
pi is known, it is sufficient to assume that it exists, that God has chosen this mass
at random according to an arbitrary distribution pi(θ) which we do not know, or in
other words that in the big bang a random process has fixed the particle masses.
Such an assumption would certainly not affect our scientific analysis techniques.
• We can argue that g(θ|x) is not all we want to know about θ. In this case we have
to demonstrate that the information missing in g is relevant to inference of θ.
There is one point of caution: The integral
∫
L(θ|x)pi(θ)dxdθ has to be finite and
the prior parameter density has to be normalizable. Thus in some cases the assumption
of an improper uniform prior extending over an infinite parameter range can lead to
problematic results. In practice, this is not a problem. For example, restricting the Higgs
mass to positive values below the Planck mass would be acceptable to every educated
scientist.
The formal proof of the LP does not require the existence of a prior.
5.2 Some objections to the Likelihood Principle
5.2.1 The likelihood function does not explore the full sample space. One
of the objection to the validity of LP is that the likelihood function cannot contain
all relevant information because it is not possible to compute frequentist confidence
intervals from the likelihood function alone.
In some occasions, like in Example 19, we know the prior density and inference on the
parameter θ can be based on Bayes’ Theorem. Bayes’ Theorem allows us, using Eq. (11)
or equivalently Eq. (16) to compute the full pdf g(θ) and the probabilities to contain
θ for arbitrary intervals. On the other hand the information L(θ|x), pi(θ) entering in
Equ. 16 is not sufficient to compute the coverage of these intervals. As a consequence,
coverage intervals must rely on elements of information which are irrelevant to g(θ).
Full information relative to θ does not imply full information relative to coverage. This
conclusion is independent on whether we know the prior or not. The fact that coverage
18It is interesting to notice that the sample pdf does not enter in Relation 16.
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cannot be computed from the likelihood function is not a valid argument against the
LP.
Another argument against the frequentist objection is the following: Assuming that
information relevant for parameter inference is missing in the likelihood function of small
samples, we hardly can imagine that by combining the likelihood functions of many
small samples to a large sample the missing information is recovered. Therefore also the
likelihood function of large samples should be insufficient to compute coverage intervals.
However, in the limit of large samples, the likelihood function usually approximates a
Gaussian and allows the derivation of frequentist intervals without requiring the pdf.
The violation of the LP by classical methods does not imply that those are wrong.
The latter address a different question. Their goal is to provide coverage while the
application of the LP is restricted to parameter inference.
5.2.2 Inference of Gaussian parameters from a single observation. Inferring
the mean µ and the width σ of a Gaussian from a single observation x we realize that the
likelihood function is infinite for µ = x, σ = 0 which implies this solution with certainty
if we apply the LP. This was one of the examples that had cast doubt on Birnbaum’s
believe in the LP [57]. However, close inspection reveals that this situation cannot occur.
No measurement can be described by a Gaussian with zero variance.
Example 24 When we turn Birnbaum’s Gaussian pdf into a more realistic pdf
f(x|θ, σ) = 1√
2pi(σ2 + s2)
exp
[
− (x− µ)
2
2(σ2 + s2)
]
where we interpret s as the known experimental resolution, we still get a maximum of
the likelihood function at µ = x, σ = 0. For s = 1 and an observation at x = 0 we find
for the log-likelihood
lnL = −0.5 ln(σ2 + 1)− µ
2
2(σ2 + 1)
+ const.
which has a narrow peak but also a long tails in σ and does not contradict our intuition.
Figure 22 shows the likelihood contours.
Example 25 We may modify Birnbaum’s example further, fix the parameter µ to µ = 0
and assume x = 0. This observation which hits exactly the prediction is likely if the
value of σ is small. The log-likelihood function is shown in Figure 22. The 1, 2 and 3
st. dev. likelihood ratio limits are σ1 < 1.31, σ2 < 7.32 and σ3 < 90. Classical intervals
would include all values of σ independent of the confidence level since the observation is
obviously compatible with any σ.
The LP does not contradict the frequentist result. It just states that all information
on σ is in the likelihood function. Certainly, we learn something about σ when we observe
a x − µ = 0, information which is completely lost in frequentist intervals but partially
conserved in likelihood ratio intervals.
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Fig. 22. One, two and three st. dev. likelihood ratio contours (left) and log-likelihood
for µ = 0 as a function of σ, Example 24
Fig. 23. Rate measurement. The time sequence is stopped when 3 events are observed
within 1 second (indicated by a bar) and a new measurement is started. Since the
combination of many conditioned measurements is equivalent to a long unconditioned
measurement, this stopping rule cannot introduce a bias
5.3 The Stopping Rule Paradox
The likelihood function is independent of the sequence of independent and identically
distributed observations. Thus, since according to the LP parameter, inference should
solely be based on the observed sample it should be independent of any sequential sam-
pling plan [56]. For example, stopping data taking in an experiment after a “golden
event” has been observed should not introduces a bias. This contradicts our naive in-
tuition and corresponds to the so-called Stopping Rule Paradox. Similarly, some people
believe that one can bias the luck in a casino by playing until the balance is positive
and stopping then.
The Stopping Rule Principle is of considerable importance for experimental tech-
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Fig. 24. Likelihood for the decay rate. Left hand: Four events are observed in one time
unit. The classical error limits depend on the stopping condition i.e. fixed time interval
or fixed event number. Right hand: Same evaluation for one event
niques19.
Frequentists claim that stopping rules introduce biasses and consequently deny the
LP. One has to admit that the Stopping Rule Principle is hard to digest.
It is easy to see that there is no bias in the example quoted above: Let us imagine that
we record experimental observations for infinitely long time where many “golden event”
are recorded. The experiment now is cut into many sub-experiments, each stopping after
a “golden event” and the sub-experiments are analyzed separately. Since nothing has
changed, the sub-experiments cannot be biassed and since the sum of the log-likelihoods
of the subsamples is equal to the log-likelihood of the full sample it is also guaranteed
that combining the results of a large number of experiments performed with an arbitrary
stopping rule asymptotically give the correct result. Of course the condition that the
subsamples are unbiassed is necessary but not sufficient for the validity of the Stopping
Rule Principle. The effect of the stopping rule “stop when 3 events are found within 1
second” is presented in Fig. 23.
In the following example we explicitly study a specific stopping rule.
Example 26 In a rate measurement 4 events have been observed within the time in-
terval t. Does the uncertainty on the rate θ depend on the two different experimental
conditions: a) The observation time had been fixed. b) The experiment had been stopped
after 4 events. In case a) the uncertainty is due to the event number fluctuation and
in b) to the time variation. The LP denies any difference, only the data actually seen
matter, while for a classical treatment also the data that could have been observed are
important. The likelihood functions La, Lb derived from the Poisson distribution and the
decay time distribution, respectively, are proportional to each other and depend only on
19Edwards, Lindman, Savage [59]: “The irrelevance of stopping rules to statistical inference restores a
simplicity and freedom to experimental design that had been lost by classical emphasis on significance
levels ... Many experimenters would like to feel free to collect data until they have either conclusively
proved their point, conclusively disproved it, or run out of time, money, or patience.”
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the observation time and the number of events seen (see Fig. 24):
La(θ, n) = P (n, θt)
=
e−θt(θt)4
4!
∝ θ4e−θt
Lb(θ, t) =
t3θ4
3!
e−θt ∝ θ4e−θt
This example is well suited to explain the essence of the LP. Followers of the LP
would bet the same amount of money that θ is located in a certain arbitrarily selected
interval in both experiments.
The stopping rule may be tested by a Monte Carlo simulation. In the previous
example we could select two arbitrary rate values θ1 and θ2 and simulate a large number
of the two kinds of experiments. For the experiments of type a) only results with 4 events
found are retained and the ratio of successes Ra for the two values of θ is formed. For
the experiments of type b) a small time slice around t is fixed and Rb is formed from the
number of cases where four events are recorded. The two ratios should be equal if the
information relative to the parameter is the same in both variants. Actually, a simulation
is not necessary. The quantities Ra and Rb are the likelihood ratios which agree because
the likelihood functions are the same up to a constant factor. The stopping rule does
not favor one or the other of the θ values. There is no bias.
A classical treatment produces inconsistent results for the two equivalent experi-
ments. The error limits depend on the way we are looking at the data (Fig. 24).
The intuitive explanation for the independence of inference of a sequential stopping
rule indicates also its limitations. The stopping rule has to be simple in the sense that
the different pieces obtained by cutting an infinitely long chain of observations cannot
be classified differently. Experiments stopped when the result is significant, when for a
long time no event has been recorded or when money has run out should be analyzed
ignoring the reason for stopping data taking.
The following example cited in the statistical literature is more subtle. Basu presents
a detailed discussion [60].
Example 27 We sample data xi following a Gaussian with unknown mean θ and width
equal to one. The mean x¯ is formed after each observation. The experiment is stopped
after observation n when one of the following conditions is fulfilled:
|x¯| > 2√
n
, or n = 1000 (17)
The idea behind this construction is to discriminate the value θ = 0 which will be off by
2 st. dev. in all cases where the first condition is realized. (One may want to stop clinical
trials when a 2 st. dev. significance is reached for the effectiveness of a certain drug.)
The second condition is introduced to avoid extremely large samples for θ = 0 (non-
performable experiments). Let us assume that an experiment produces an event of size
n = 100 and |x¯| = 0.21 > 2/√100. When we ignore the stopping condition a frequen-
tist would exclude the parameter value θ = 0 with > 95% confidence (tail probability).
Knowing the stopping rule, he would realize that the first of the two conditions 17 has
been fulfilled and probably be willing to accept θ = 0 as a possible value. Wouldn’t we
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include the stopping condition into our considerations? Basu [60] and also Berger and
Wolpert [52] deny this and argue that our intuition is misled. In fact, the likelihood at
θ = 0 is not really reduced by the stopping rule, it is the integrated tail which is small,
because the likelihood function becomes narrower with increasing n.
In the last example certainly is not easy to accept the likelihood solution and it is
less the problem to understand that θ = 0 is not excluded but rather to accept that
some value different from zero has a very large value of the likelihood even when θ = 0
is correct.
The stopping rule changes the experiment and some rules are not very useful. But
this is not in contradiction to the fact, once the data are at hand, knowing the stopping
rule does not help to improve the inference of the parameter of interest.
5.4 Stein’s example
In 1960, L. J. Savage emphasized [61]: “If the LP were untenable, clear-cut counter-
examples by now would have come forward. But such examples seem, rather, to illu-
minate, strengthen, and confirm the principle.” One year later C. Stein [62] came up
with his famous example which we will discuss in this section. Since then, other more or
less exotic counter-examples have been invented to disprove the LP. The corresponding
distributions exhibit strange infinities and are far from what we can expect in physics.
Nevertheless, they are very instructive.
Stein has been introduced the probability density
f(X, θ) =
a
X
exp
{
−100(θ −X)
2
2X2
}
, for 0 ≤ X ≤ bθ
where for simplicity we have fixed the slope parameter in the exponent.
The functional form resembles a Gaussian with width proportional to the mean value
as shown in Fig. 25a and 25b but it has a long tail towards large values of X which com-
pletely dominates the distribution. The range of X is restricted by the cutoff parameter
b to obtain a normalizable density. Since the 1/X term almost insures convergence the
upper limit of X may be rather large for not too large a. The two constants a, b are
fixed by the normalization condition and the requirement that X exceeds θ by at least
a factor of ten in 99% of the cases.∫ bθ
0
f(X, θ)dX = 1∫ bθ
10θ
f(X, θ)dX = 0.99 (18)
The cutoff parameter is huge bθ > 10(10
22) and a ≈ 0.04. Figure 25a,b are plots of Stein’s
function with the specific choice θ = 5. Only about 1% of the X-values lie inside the
bell shaped part (X < 50) of the probability density, the remaining part is located in
the long right hand tail.
Frequentist and Bayesian confidence intervals 50
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
c)
L( θ
|x=
8)
θ
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
b)
ln
(f)
X
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
a)
99 %
f(x
|5)
X
Iljxuh 4=
4
Fig. 25. Stein’s test function (a,b) with a long tail towards large x. The maximum is
close to the parameter value. The Gaussian likelihood function for an observation x = 8
is shown in (c)
5.4.1 The paradox and its solution. For a single observation x the likelihood
function for the Stein pdf is:
L(θ) ∼ exp
{
−100(θ − x)
2
2x2
}
, for x/b < θ <∞
It is proportional to the likelihood function of a Gaussian centered at x, with width
s = x/10 and restricted to positive θ. It is displayed in Fig. 25c for x = 8. (There is
a small difference in the validity range of θ for the Gaussian and Stein’s distribution
which numerically is of no importance.)
If the likelihood function contains the full information relative to the parameter, the
inferences on θ should be the same for the very different distributions, the Gaussian and
the Stein function. However, one might conclude from Eq. (18) that the Stein parameter
θ is 10 times smaller than the observation x in 99% of the cases, while the Gaussian case
would favor a parameter in the vicinity of the observation [62]. It seems silly to select
the same confidence interval in both cases.
The solution of Stein’s paradox can be summarized as follows:
• The LP does not relate different probability densities. It just states that the like-
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lihood function contains the full information relative to the unknown parameter.
Thus there is no contradiction in the fact that the same likelihood belongs to two
different probability densities.
• The assertion “from X > 10θ in 99% of the cases for given θ, independent of
the value of θ, follows that for given x we have θ < x/10 in 99% of the case,
independent of the value of x” is not conclusive.
• Related to the last point: The same θ interval corresponds to very different cover-
ages in the two cases, Gaussian and Stein pdf. Coverage, however, is a frequentist
concept which is not computable from the likelihood function. This is not specific
to Stein’s example and thus not relevant here.
It is easily seen that for any proper (normalizable) prior density the inferences for
the Gaussian and the Stein cases should be identical while the classical intervals are
rather strange in some cases.
Let us look at an example: We select a uniform prior function pi(θ) = 0.1 and
0 < θ < 10. In most cases one would get x much larger than θ, say x = 101000. Obviously,
we cannot learn much from such an observation, a fact which translates into a likelihood
function which is completely flat in the allowed θ range:
L = exp
{
−100(θ − x)
2
2x2
}
∼ exp {−100θ/x} ≈ 1
The same result would be obtained for a Gaussian pdf, except that the occurrence of
very large x is rare.
Now assume x = 5. Then
L(θ) ∼ exp
{
−(θ − 5)
2
2 · 0.52
}
, for 5/b < θ < 10
is a Gaussian of width s = 0.5 and we guess that θ is near to x. In both cases, for
the Gaussian pdf and the Stein pdf the results derived from the likelihood function are
very reasonable. The difference between the two is that in the former case likelihood
functions centered around small x are frequent and in the latter those centered at large
x, but for a given observation this is irrelevant. The reader is invited to invent other
prior densities and to search for inconsistencies in the Bayesian treatment.
The argument of Stein relies on the following frequentist observation. Assume θ values
are selected in a range θ < θmax. Then in 99% of all cases the likelihood function would
favor θˆ ≈ x > 10θmax, an estimate which is considerably worse than the classical one.
The flaw of the argument is due to the inconsistency in selecting specific test parameters
θ and using a uniform prior of θ extending to some 10(10
20)θmax.
5.4.2 Classical treatment. What would a classical treatment give for central 99%
confidence intervals?
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∫ bθlow
x
f(X, θlow)dX = 0.005 =⇒ θlow ≪ x∫ x
0
f(X, θhigh)dX = 0.005 =⇒ θhigh ≪ x
For any reasonably small x both limits would be nearly zero. For very large x the
classical procedure produces a rather wide θ interval. Qualitatively the classical interval
fails to contain the true value in the 1% cases where the observation falls into the bell
shaped part of the distribution but produces a safe result in the remaining 99% where x
is located in the tail. Thus the correct coverage is guaranteed but in some cases ridiculous
error limits have to be quoted. This is the well known problem of classical statistics: It
can produce results that are known to be wrong. In the remaining cases the interval will
be enormously wide and extend to extremely large values.
Example 28 A Susy Particle has a mass of θ = 1 eV. A physicist who does not know
this value designs an experiment to measure the mass in the range from 0.001 eV<
θ < 1 TeV through a quantity x depending on θ according to the Stein distribution. (It
is certainly not easy to determine a parameter θ over 15 orders of magnitude from a
quantity x which may vary over 1020 orders of magnitude.) A 99% confidence level is
envisaged. A frequentist analysis of the data will provide wrong limits 0 < θ ≪ 0.1 eV
in 1 % of the cases and huge, useless intervals in the remaining ones (except for a tiny
fraction). In contrast, a Bayesian physicist will obtain a correct and useful limit in 1%
of the cases and a result similar to the classical one in the remaining cases.
It is impossible to invent a realistic experimental situation where the Bayesian treat-
ment of the Stein problem produces wrong results. The Stein function plays with loga-
rithmic infinities, which cannot occur in reality. Limiting the uniform prior20 to a reason-
able range or using other normalizable prior densities avoids the paradoxical conclusion
of Stein. Experimental conditions always forbid improper prior densities.
5.5 Stone’s example
Another nice example has been presented by M. Stone [63] which is presented here in
simplified form. The Stone example is much closer to problems arising in physics than
the rather exotic Stein Paradox.
Example 29 A drunken sailer starts from a fixed intersection of streets and proceeds
at random through the square net of streets oriented along the directions N, W, S, E
(see Fig. 26)21. At a certain intersection x he stops. The problem is to guess the last
crossing before the stop, i.e. the direction. We name the four possible origins n, w, s, e.
Starting in a random direction from e, the probability to arrive at x is 1/4. Thus the
likelihood for e is also 1/4. The same likelihoods apply for the other three locations. With
a “non-informative” prior for the locations, one has to associate equal probabilities to all
four possibilities. This is in contradiction to the correct intuition that a position between
the starting point and the stop is more likely than 1/4.
20Any other normalizable prior would produce very similar results.
21The analogy to physics is not between the sailor and drunken physicists but between his random
walk and diffusion.
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Fig. 26. Modified Stone’s example: The problem is to infer the last step knowing start
and stop positions
The example does not directly involve the LP [64] but it questions inference based
solely on the likelihood function. Here, the solution is rather simple: There is information
about the prior and it is clearly not uniform. (In the original version of the example the
prior has an even stronger influence.) Including the prior information, and using the
constant likelihood we obtain a correct result [64, 52].
It is not clear, what a classical solution of the problem would look like.
The fact, that so far no simple counter-example to the LP has been found provides
strong support to this principle.
5.6 Goodness-of-fit tests
Significance tests cannot be based on the LP since there is no parameter differentiating
between the hypothesis at hand and the rather diffuse alternatives. For this reason they
have been criticized especially by Bayesians [5, 65] and some statisticians adhering to
the LP [21]. However, as long as no better alternatives are available, classical methods
should be used. Goodness-of-fit tests like the Neyman-Pearson or Kolmogorov tests
are very useful and cannot easily be replaced by likelihood based recipes. Note that
also here the subjectivity problem is present. The binning has to be chosen according
to the Bayesian expectation of possible deviations. A rough binning neglects narrow
deviations and with fine binning in the Neyman-Pearson test the statistical fluctuations
hide systematic deviations [66]. Also the fact that we use one-sided tests has a Bayesian
origin.
The approach to significance tests and classical confidence limits is very similar, but
significance tests are not related logically to interval estimation.
5.7 Randomization
Randomization is an important tool in many statistical applications like clinical tests and
survey studies. For example, we might select randomly fifty CERN physicists and ask
them their opinion on closing down the LEP machine. It might turn out that by accident
the majority of the selected physicists are involved in LEP experiments. This post-
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experimental information has to be ignored in a frequentist approach in contradiction
to the LP but explains the outcome.
Strong criticism of randomization is expressed by Basu [67] and it seems obvious
that with a good unbiassed judgement one should be able to get better performance
than by random selection. Yet, there are cases where this classical procedure is very
useful - think of Monte Carlo simulation - and especially for experiments with large
statistics the Bayesian objections are less convincing. This point of view is shared by
prominent Bayesians like Savage [61]: “The theory of personal probability ... does lead
to new insight into the role and limitations of randomization but does by no means
deprive randomization of its important function in statistics.”
In conclusion, there are useful frequentist concepts which are not respecting the LP.
We should neither exclude these methods nor use them as an argument against the
LP. Goodness-of-fit tests and randomization methods have no bearing whatsoever on
parameter interval estimation for a given pdf.
5.8 Precision and consistency
Following the LP we can fix an ordering principle for precision.
Two measurements E1, E2 of the same parameter are equally precise if their likelihood
functions L1(θ) and L2(θ) are proportional to each other. E1 is more precise than E2
if they have the maximum at the same parameter value θmax and if L1(θ) < cL2(θ)
for all other values of θ where the normalization constant c is fixed by L1(θmax) =
cL2(θmax). The narrower the likelihood function is, the more precise is the measurement.
This requirement should be acceptable to all statisticians. We could extend our modest
requirement to a general definition but then it would single out a specific statistical
method.
A statistical approach is inconsistent if it associates different error intervals to equally
precise measurements or if it produces smaller error intervals for less precise measure-
ments than for more precise ones.
6 Comparison of the methods
The quality of a confidence interval is measured
• in the classical approach by coverage, the average number of intervals containing
the true value of a parameter,
• by the likelihood ratio in likelihood ratio intervals,
• by the probability obtained by integrating likelihood times uniform prior over the
interval.
Likelihood ratio and Bayesian intervals are related numerically. The standard likeli-
hood ratio intervals corresponds to 68.3 % Bayesian probability in the parameter space
where the likelihood function is Gaussian and the prior is uniform.
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6.1 Difference in philosophy
Before we compare the frequentist methods with the likelihood based approaches in
detail, let us come back to the example (see Fig. 1) presented in the introduction which
is repeated in more detail as Example 13/14.
Frequentists test the compatibility of data with a parameter and independent of
details of the theoretical prediction, they want to be right in a specified fraction of
cases. The confidence level is a kind of “inclusion probability” of the correct parameter
value inside the interval and is fixed. The “exclusion probability” of wrong parameter
values which depends on the width of the probability distribution is at least partially
ignored in the classical approaches. In the language of discrete parameters one could say
that the “error of the second kind22” is not fully considered. The wider the distribution
is, the likelier it is to include a wrong parameter in the confidence interval.
Since the confidence interval is based on an integration of the pdf it depends on data
that potentially could have been observed. The probability to observe the actual value
x is not enough for classical reasoning. Intuitively, one would find the two parameter
values θ1 and θ2 which satisfy f(x|θ1) = f(x|θ2) equally acceptable, but the non locality
of the frequentist coverage introduces a difference.
On the other hand in concepts based on the likelihood function only the value of the
pdf at the observed data is important. The methods are local in the sample space. To
illustrate the idea behind it, it is simpler to argue with discrete variables.
Example 30 Assume, we have a bag with many dice of seven different kinds, all dif-
ferently biassed, except for die type “7” which is unbiassed. We do not know the number
of dies of each kind. Each of the biassed dies favors a different number with probability
1/2. The remaining numbers have probabilities of 1/10. One of the dies of unknown
type is selected and thrown. We observe the number “3” and have to estimate the type.
The following table contains the probabilities p(3|type) to observe “3” for the seven
dies. Obviously, we would select die “3” and we would not care about the probabilities
p(1), p(2), p(4), p(5), p(6) for alternative outcomes. Thus we would base our decision on
the observation only and not consider the remaining sample space.
die type 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
p(3|type) 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 1/6
If we would repeat the experiment many times with the same die, we would always
select one of the first six die types and never die “7”. Thus a frequentist would argue
that the procedure is inadmissible because the procedure does not provide equal cover-
age to all hypotheses. A Bayesian would not care about long term coverage. He wants
to make the optimum decision in the present case and select the die which gives the
largest likelihood. Why is long term coverage not an issue? The Bayesian updates his
information by multiplying the likelihoods of the individual trials and after some 20
experiments, he then, if “7” applies would probably find for die “7” a higher likelihood
than for the other dies.
Let us look at another very extreme example.
22Error of the second kind: Accepting a hypothesis when it is false.
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Example 31 An electronic code reader is able to identify the number 0.45301. For any
other input number it will produce a random output θ between zero and one. Both, the
sample variable X and the parameter θ are restricted to the interval [0,1]. For the sake
of the argument, let us assume that the device has infinite resolution, and that numbers
have an infinite number of digits.
f(X|θ) =
{
δ(X − θ) for θ = 0.45301
1 for θ 6= 0.45301
}
The observation is x = 0.45301. The classical confidence interval would be the full
interval 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. The Bayesian result would be θ = 0.45301±0 with 100 % confidence.
I believe, everybody would intuitively support the Bayesian conclusion.
Classical confidence intervals are not well qualified for decision making. Even advo-
cates of the classical concept admit that for decision making classical limits may not
be optimum [9]. The question is then, what else should they be used for? Frequentists,
however, argue that the intention of inference is not necessarily to optimize decisions.
Kendall and Stuart [68] write: “Some writers have gone so far as to argue that all esti-
mation and hypothesis-testing are, in fact, decision-making operations. We emphatically
disagree, both that all statistical inquiry emerges in decisions and that the consequences
of many decisions can be evaluated numerically.”
Narsky [69] who compares several different approaches to the estimation of upper
Poisson limits, states: “There is no such thing as the best procedure for upper limit
estimation. An experimentalist is free to choose any procedure she/he likes, based on
her/his belief and experience. The only requirement is that the chosen procedure must
have a strict mathematical foundation.” This opinion is typical for many papers on
confidence limits. However, “the real test of the pudding is in its eating” and not in the
beauty of the cooking recipe. We should state what we aim for and should not forget
that what we measure has practical implications, hopefully!
6.2 Relevance, consistency and precision
A. W. F. Edwards writes [21]: “Relative support (He refers to a hypothesis or a pa-
rameter) must be consistent in different applications, so that we are content to react
equally to equal values, and it must not be affected by information judged intuitively to
be irrelevant.” We can check whether we consider information as “irrelevant” when we
consider betting odds. When the amount of money we are ready to bet that θ is in a cer-
tain interval is independent of part of the available information, then this information
is considered irrelevant.
The most obvious example for the violation of this principle in all classical approaches
is the Poisson case with background expected but where no event is observed (Examples
11, 12). Other examples are related to the dependence of classical results on the sampling
plan (Example 26) For this reason alone, classical limits are to be discarded as a useful
description of uncertainty.
Formally, the inconsistency of classical limits, the fact that different limits are ob-
tained in equivalent situations manifests itself as a violation of the LP which requires
equal parameter inference for equal likelihood functions. In the Poisson case [32] for n
events found and b background events expected, the likelihood function for the signal
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parameter µ is
L(µ) ∼
n∑
b′=0
P (b′|b)P (n− b′|µ)
and for n = 0 it reduces to
L(µ) ∝ e−µ
independent of the background expectation. In Fig. 16 the likelihood function is com-
pared to the classical and Bayesian results.
Similarly, different stopping rules which produce identical likelihood functions lead
to different classical limits (Example 26). Another example is presented by Berger and
Berry [70].
In the previous section we discussed the notion of precision and established an or-
dering principle.
This principle is violated in classical statistics in our standard Poisson example: An
experimental result of zero events n = 0 found with background expectation b = 0 is
clearly more exclusive than a result n = 1 with b = 3. This obvious conclusion based
on common sense is confirmed by the formal argument that the measurement observing
n = 0 is the more precise because the likelihood function L(θ|n = 0, b = 0) is steeper
than L(θ|n = 1, b = 3) for all values of θ. The corresponding 90 % upper confidence
limits 2.44 and 1.88 of the unified approach [9] invert the sequence of precision.
All problems in the frequentist approach have the same origin: The limits depend on
the full sample pdf. However, there is no reason why we should care about the probability
of events that have not occurred.
These statements should not be misunderstood. The classical approach in itself is
not inconsistent but it does not provide a consistent measure of uncertainty.
The deficiency of classical upper limits is also recognized by some frequentists. They
accept that the classical confidence intervals are not always useful measures of precision.
But, what else should they be used for? To cure the problem, Feldman and Cousins [9]
propose to supplement the confidence limit by an additional quantity called sensitivity23.
However, they do not explain how to combine the two quantities to produce a sensitive
measure for the relative precision of different experimental results and how to use the
confidence interval to check the compatibility of the measurement with a theoretical
prediction.
Bayesian methods are in agreement with the LP and respect the consistency property.
Problems may occur for probability densities with multiple maxima when the prior
density is updated with increasing event number [71]. These exotic cases are not relevant
in real physics problems and cannot be handled by classical methods either. Complicated
situations should be represented by likelihood maps.
In the limit that the assumption of a uniform prior density is correct, likelihood ratio
intervals are optimum: For a given interval length the probability to contain the true
parameter value is maximum. In other words, avoiding the notion of prior density, the
likelihood interval contains the parameter values best supported by the data.
23Oviously, frequentists realize that important information is not contained in the frequentist limits
interval.
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Classical methods hardly emphasize precision. Nevertheless they discuss “minimum
length” and “likelihood ratio” intervals. Clearly, classical intervals cannot be optimum
when they violate the LP because then they ignore available information. For example,
it is easy to improve negative Poisson limits or unphysical intervals. Qualitatively, the
intervals from the unified approach are expected to be superior to other classical intervals
with respect to precision.
Frequentists sometimes argue that the performance of different approaches should
not be compared looking at specific examples but that it is the average performance
which is relevant. On the other hand, also the average performance is improved if more
reasonable solutions are implemented in individual disturbing cases. Why should it harm
to modify intervals like zero length intervals which with certainty do not include the true
value?
6.3 Coverage
In the classical approach we have the attractive property that a well known fraction of
experimental results contain the true value of a measured parameter within the quoted
error limits. As explained in the introductory example, coverage is a democratic prin-
ciple which gives different true parameter values the same chance to be included in a
confidence interval.
Major criticism of the classical concepts is related to the requirement of pre-experimental
definition of the analysis methods necessary to guarantee coverage. Conditioning on the
actual observation is forbidden. However as shown by Kiefer [72], conditioning and cov-
erage are not always exclusive.
On the other hand for an individual experiment we cannot deduce from the computed
coverage a probability that the result is true and it is the latter we need to make decisions.
Example 32 An experimenter tosses a coin to decide whether the Higgs mass is larger
or less than 100 GeV and finds that it is larger. The confidence level is 50%. It would be
stupid to deduce from this “observation” a probability of 50% for the Higgs mass to be
larger than the arbitrarily selected mass value of 100 GeV. Confidence is deduced from
zero information.
The admiration of coverage by many physicists is due to an illusion: They inadver-
tently mix coverage with the probability that the true value of the parameter is located
inside the confidence interval even if they intellectually realize the difference. In reality,
the only possible way to derive such a probability is to invent a Bayesian prior to mul-
tiply it with the likelihood function and to integrate the product over the confidence
interval. We cannot do any better. On the other hand, coverage is not a useless quality
as some Bayesians claim. Coverage intervals retain a large fraction of the information
contained in the likelihood function.
Coverage is a property of an ensemble of experiments and makes sense if an experi-
ment is repeated many times24. Let us assume that we have 10 experiments measuring
with different precision a particle mass and providing 90 % confidence intervals each. It
will not be probable that more than one or two of the limits will not contain the true
24Insurance companies may rely on coverage.
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value. This will certainly give us an idea where the true value may be located, but a
quantitative evaluation is difficult.
Although it is quite rare in physics applications that we have an ensemble of similar
experiments, let us assume that this is the case. What would we do with our results? We
would probably not be satisfied contemplating the different confidence intervals but try
to combine them25. If possible, we would go back to the original data, combine them to a
high statistics experiment and then forget about the individual data sets. Thus, we have
again a single experiment. There is no obvious reason to consider ensembles. Otherwise
we would subdivide high statistics experiments in many low statistics measurements. In
conclusion, the problem of parameter inference can be discussed on the basis of single
experiments.
The violation of coverage due to the separate treatment of upper limits and intervals
was the main motivation for the development of the unified approach. In the years before
the adoption of this new scheme, rare decay searches usually presented Bayesian upper
limits - not intervals - when the result was compatible with background. It is hard to
detect negative consequences from the former procedure to the progress of physics.
The main problems with the coverage paradigm are the following:
• Coverage often is only approximate. There is complete overcoverage in Poisson
distributed data with mean zero and in digital measurements.
• The usual treatment of nuisance parameters [23] can lead to undercoverage.
• It is difficult to retain coverage when results are averaged.
• The principle is not universally applied. When the prior density is known, like in
Example 19 the coverage requirement is put aside.
Classical confidence cannot be attributed to intervals based on the likelihood func-
tion. The PDG [12] gives the advice to determine the true coverage by a Monte Carlo
simulation. It is not possible to associate a single classical confidence level to an arbi-
trary interval. Of course, coverage as a function of the true value can be computed but
it is not very economic to first compress a measurement into an estimate and an error
interval and the to complement it by a function.
6.4 Invariance under variate and parameter transformations
We consider the following non-linear parameter transformation θ′ = u(θ) since linear
transformations do not pose problems.
θˆ′ = u(θˆ) (19)
θ′low = u(θlow)
θ′high = u(θhigh)
Clearly, the probabilities P (θlow < θ < θhigh) and P (θ
′
low < θ
′ < θ′high) are the same.
In addition, we may transform the sample space variables and consequently also the
probability densities f(X) −→ g(X ′).
25Insurance companies cannot do this.
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Invariance means that i) the probability and ii) the interval limits are the same inde-
pendent of the initial choice of the parameter θ or θ′ for which we compute the confidence
interval and independent of the sample variable to which the definition applies.
a) In the frequentist scheme both conditions are satisfied with the likelihood ratio
ordering used in the unified approach and in the conventional scheme when central inter-
vals are chosen, a choice which is restricted to the single variate case. Equal probability
density intervals defined in X usually differ from probability density intervals in X ′.
Shortest confidence intervals depend on the parameter choice.
General transformations of a multi-dimensional sample space may lead to concave
probability contours and ruin the whole concept.
Conceptually the parameter and sample variable dependence is acceptable: The pa-
rameters and the sample variables have to be chosen pre-experimentally in a reasonable
way independent of the result of the experiment similarly to all the other analysis pro-
cedures in the classical method. Nevertheless, it is disturbing that a physicist’s choice
to determine a confidence interval from a mass squared distribution instead from a sim-
ple mass distribution may produce different limits26. Thus the likelihood ratio ordering
which is free of this problem is certainly to be preferred to the other classical methods.
b) Likelihood ratio intervals are strictly invariant under parameter transformations.
The support by data is independent of the choice of the parameter. It is also invariant
against transformations of the sample variable.
c) The Bayesian method conserves probability if the prior is transformed according
to:
pi′(θ′)dθ′ = pi(θ)dθ
Of course not both prior densities pi and pi′ can be uniform. The invariance of the
probability is guaranteed, but the size of the interval depends on the primary parameter
choice for which we required pi(θ) = const. With our requirement of using uniform priors,
the Bayesian prescription is not invariant under transformations of the parameter.
The fact that the choice of a parameter space affects the result of an analysis is quite
common. Very useful parameters like root mean square errors are not invariant. The
success of inference procedures like pattern recognition strongly relies on the adequate
selection of the observation space. We use Dalitz plots to detect resonances above a
smooth background, r− φ plots to find particle tracks in collider experiments, rapidity,
q2, x distributions etc.. Part of data analysis skills consists in selecting the right variables
and often results rely on an educated choice.
I find it rather natural that a scientist chooses not only the selection criteria but also
the parameter and sample space variables. In many cases there is quite some common
agreement on a reasonable choice (for example 1/p for tracking, m2 for neutrino mass
limits, γ for the decay rate).
6.5 Error treatment
Error propagation is simple when the distributions are Gaussian and the functions are
linear. All other cases are difficult to handle and very little guidance can be found in
the literature. A detailed discussion of the problem is beyond the scope of this article.
26This happens, for example, if the probability contours in the sample space are locations of constant
pdf.
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Fig. 27. Lifetime measurements using 10 and 2 events. The error bars from different
methods are given for a measurement coinciding with the true lifetime. The letters refer
to classical (c), likelihood (l) and Bayesian (b)
Error propagation requires not only an error interval, but also a parameter estima-
tion. The usual choice for the latter is the maximum likelihood estimate27. To classical
methods other choices are better adapted. Central intervals are well compatible with the
estimate which we obtain when we shrink the confidence interval to zero width. These
estimates, however, usually are not very efficient estimators.
The errors - better called uncertainties - of a measurement are usually not accurately
known and this is also not necessary. A precision of about 10% is good enough in most
cases. Thus, we should be satisfied with reasonable approximations.
6.5.1 Error definition. In the classical schemes error intervals are typically 68.3 %
confidence intervals. They are well defined, except for the arbitrariness of the definition
of the probability intervals.
Physicists usually publish the asymmetric likelihood ratio limits which provide ap-
proximate information of the shape of the likelihood function.
The Bayesian probability distributions for parameters gives full freedom (which is
a disadvantage) in defining the error. An obvious choice is to use mean value, variance,
and, when necessary skewness and kurtosis of the parameter probability density. This
method has the advantage that tails in the likelihood function are taken into account.
A comparison of error bounds of lifetime measurements from the different methods is
presented in Fig. 27 where we show the error intervals for a measurements of the decay
parameter γ = 1 obtained from the observations of ten and two decays, respectively.
In the figure equal tail is synonymous with central, short indicates that the interval has
minimum length. There are considerable differences for small event numbers. In the case
of ten events the differences between various definitions are already negligible.
The Bureau International de Poids et Mesures (BIPM) and the International Orga-
nization for Standardization (ISO) have issued some recommendations [73] on how to
27In our context the least squares estimate is equivalent.
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define errors. After having distributed a questionnaire among a large number of scientists
BIPM and ISO have essentially adopted a Bayesian inspired method. They recommend
to quantify the uncertainty by the variance and not by a classical confidence interval or
a likelihood ratio interval.
6.5.2 Error propagation in general. To conserve the confidence level or the prob-
ability, all methods call for an explicit transformation following generalized Eqs. (19).
The multivariate problem Yk = Yk(X1, X2, ...XN) involves a variable transformation
plus the elimination of nuisance parameters. Here again, classical methods fail. Only the
Bayesian way permits a consistent solution of the problem.
Transformations conserving probability often produce strong biasses and very asym-
metric error bounds in the new variables. Following the ISO recommendations one has
to accept a certain violation of probability conservation and work with the moments of
the Bayesian distributions or the asymmetric likelihood errors.
A reasonable approximation is obtained inserting the moments of the probability
densities of the variates Xi into the Taylor expansions of Yk.
6.5.3 Systematic errors.
Example 33 Variations in the response of a calorimeter introduce a systematic un-
certainty in the measurement of some particle mass. Calibration runs are performed at
the beginning and the end of the experiment to obtain the energy scale. The system-
atic r.m.s. uncertainty is estimated to be half the difference of the observed variation.
This estimate is rather crude and very little is known about the corresponding probability
density. We would certainly hesitate to believe in a Gaussian three standard deviation
probability derived from it. If in our experiment calibration runs were performed with
high frequency we could get a rather precise knowledge of the fluctuations and derive a
statistical calibration error.
Usually, errors are called systematic if the are independent of the number of observa-
tions, typically when they cannot be derived from Poisson or multinomial distributions.
However, the separation of statistical and systematic errors often is rather artificial and
often systematic errors can be reduced with higher statistics. A wider definition includes
all kind of errors where the pdf is badly known.
A crudely known systematic error can be modelled by a pdf with long tails.
The combination of many different systematic error distributions with similar vari-
ance, according to the Central Limit Theorem, can be approximated by a Gaussian with
variance equal to the sum of the individual variances. Then non-Gaussian tails can be
neglected.
It is useful to state statistical and systematic errors separately. For example, when
we observe a five standard deviation effect, we would like to know whether the error
is dominated by systematics or whether it is purely statistical. Sometimes we have to
combine the two kind of errors, when results from different experiments are summarized
or when a hypothesis is to be tested. Then we should add the errors in quadrature.
When a single systematic error has similar size as the statistical error, we better use a
conservative estimate of the systematic error before combining the two.
It is not clear how to incorporate the frequentist notion of coverage in the definition
of systematic errors.
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6.6 Combining data
One of the simpler aspects of error propagation is the computation of an average from
individual measurements of the same quantity.
Increasing precision by combining data from different experiments contributes to a
continuous progress of knowledge in science.
Following the LP we conclude:
The only way to combine measurements without loss of information is to add their
log-likelihood functions.
This step does not require a definition of the error.
Frequentist methods cannot compute confidence limits from the likelihood function.
Thus they have to invent other prescriptions to combine data. No generally accepted
method is known to me. Especially in unified approaches additional information to the
error limits is necessary to perform sensible combinations. Complicated procedures have
been invented to combine upper limits [74].
The usual averaging procedure, weighting the individual measurement with δ−2, the
inverse of the error squared, assumes that the errors are proportional to the standard
deviation of a probability density of the measured quantity and that the measurement
itself corresponds to its expectation value. Coverage properties are not considered.
The PDG [75] uses the following recipe for the combination of measurements with
asymmetric errors: The mean value is computed iteratively, weighting the individual
measurements with the inverse of the error squared. The error is a function of the
resulting mean value. When the mean value is located inside the error interval a linear
interpolation between the lower and upper side errors is used. When the mean value is
outside the interval, the corresponding lower or upper error is chosen.
In principle, it would be more consistent to apply the linear error function also outside
the interval. Let us call this method PDG extended. On the other hand the pragmatic
procedure of the PDG has the advantage to be less sensitive to tails in the distributions.
Applying the usual prescriptions to add measurements with error intervals as de-
scribed in the PDG book i) certainly will not conserve coverage and ii) the result will
depend on the chosen scheme of defining the bounds.
For asymmetric likelihood ratio errors, the standard averaging procedure where the
inverse of the full width is used as a weighting factor is only approximately correct.
Better results are obtained with the PDG prescription. Alternatively, one could construct
approximate log-likelihood functions of parabolic shape from the maximum likelihood
estimate and the asymmetric errors and then add the approximated log-likelihoods.
Example 34 We assume that an infinite number of identical experiments determine
the mean lifetime of a particle with true mean lifetime τ0 from the observation of two
decay times. The time distribution is exponential. The results τi of the estimates from the
individual experiments are averaged. Table 3 summarize the results of different averaging
procedures. The first column presents the results when the procedure is applied to the
lifetime estimates τi, the second column contains the results when the averaging starts
from the estimates of the decay constants γi = 1/τi. There is no unique prescription
for averaging classical intervals. To compute the classical value given in the table, the
maximum likelihood estimate and central intervals were used.
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Table 3. Average of an infinite number of equivalent lifetime measurements using dif-
ferent weighting procedures, see Example 34
method < τ/τ0 > < γ/γ0 >
adding log-likelihood functions 1 1
classical, weight: δ−2 0.0 0.67
likelihood, weight: PDG 0.26 0.80
likelihood, weight: PDG extended 0.69 0.85
Bayesian mean, uniform prior, weight: δ−2 ∞ 1
In this special example a consistent result is obtained in the Bayesian method with
uniform prior for the decay constant. This indicates how critical the choice of the param-
eter is in the Bayesian approach. It is also clear that an educated choice is also important
for the pragmatic procedures. From the discussion of Example 22 it should be clear that
the decay constant is the better parameter. Methods approximating the likelihood func-
tion provide reasonable results unless the likelihood function is very asymmetric. The
conservative weighting procedure of the PDG is inferior to the extended scheme (which
may be dangerous in other cases). The simple classical average is the least precise of all.
As is well known, the combination of likelihood functions is optimum.
6.7 Bias
Most of the text books on statistics and also the PDG claim that parameter estimates
should be unbiassed28, and when they are not, we are advised to correct for the bi-
asses. One argument for preferring unbiased estimators is the property of the maximum
likelihood estimate to be efficient (most precise) when unbiassed. Estimates from small
samples often are biassed.
Since both properties, efficiency and bias, are not invariant under change of param-
eter, the requirement that estimated parameters should be unbiassed is not so obvious.
The situation is more tricky than it appears at first sight. What should we conclude
from the fact that the maximum likelihood estimate γˆ of the decay constant from an
exponential decay distribution is biassed but τˆ = 1/γˆ is not? Is the result τˆ more precise
than γˆ and should we correct γˆ for its bias?
A bias in itself is not necessarily a bad property. What really matters is a bias of
the estimator weighted with its inverse error squared, the quantity which is used for
averaging data. When we compute an average of several unbiassed measurements the
result may very well be biassed and the average of a large number of biassed estimates
may be unbiased.
An average of unbiassed measurements with errors proportional to the parameter
value will be systematically too small. We have demonstrated this in the previous section
(see Table 3). The unbiassed lifetime estimate produces a strongly biassed average and
the biassed decay parameter estimate gives an unbiassed result.
The correct procedure is obviously to combine the log-likelihoods. A bias in the
maximum likelihood estimate present in the individual experiments asymptotically dis-
appears with increasing number of data. The PDG prescription, when using the asym-
metric likelihood ratio errors is an approximation of the exact method, namely, adding
the log-likelihoods.
28The expectation value of an unbiassed estimator of a parameter is equal to the parameter.
Frequentist and Bayesian confidence intervals 65
Biasses usually are correlated with small event numbers and large errors which require
a cautious treatment also in the context of error propagation. A non-linear function
y(xub) with xub unbiassed and large uncertainty will give a biassed result y. The bias
corrected estimators xub, yub would not follow the same function, i.e. yub(xub) 6= y(xub)
and consequently confidence limits which are invariant under the variable transformation
y(x) would not be invariant under yub(xub) and thus not be relevant for the estimate yub.
We will have to be very careful in the treatment of biasses.
Not much can be said about the bias observed in classical methods. There are too
many ways to define the limits and also a clear prescription of combining measurements
is missing.
6.8 Subjectivity
In the field of statistics the word subjective usually is associated to probabilities not
definable through frequencies and also as a somewhat negative label for the Bayesian
school. Here, we will use it in its common meaning. In experimental design and data
analysis many decisions have to be made which are not obvious and consequently depend
on personal judgements. However, these decisions should be concerned merely with the
quality (precision) of the result and avoid as much as possible to introduce biasses.
Where this is unavoidable, the procedure has to be documented and allow to the reader
of a publication to use the results without adopting the personal judgements of the
publishing group. To be more precise, we would like the results to be as much as possible
independent of event selection criteria, stopping rules, Monte Carlo parameters, fitting
procedures, etc..
Bayesian methods often are accused of being subjective and sometimes they really
are. However, the Bayesian confidence intervals as defined in this article obviously con-
tain no subjective elements except for the choice of the parameter which is documented.
Transformations to other parameters are possible with the published results, of course
with limited precision.
Likelihood ratio intervals are rather insensitive to subjective decisions.
On the other hand it is very difficult to avoid subjective elements in a classical
confidence level analysis: Consider two identical experiments looking for a rare event to
be identified in a mass plot. In the first experiment within a range corresponding to 3 st.
dev. of the mass resolution no event is observed at the expected mass and a 90% upper
limit for the occurrence is computed. In the second experiment there are a few events
in the region of interest but these events are compatible with background. Usually the
experimentalist would try to reduce the background by applying some clever cuts and
if this is not successful he would estimate the background probability and include it in
the computation of the limit. He also might decide not to publish, because his colleague
of the first experiment has obtained a more restrictive limit. These subjective decisions
completely ruin the classical probability interpretation which is only valid if the scientist
decides when to stop an experiment, how to treat the data and whether to publish before
he looks at the data - not a very realistic scenario.
A blind analysis avoids some of these subjective elements and in some situations
it is quite sensible independent of the statistical procedure used. Adopted as a general
principle it would inhibit discoveries and delay the progress in science.
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6.9 Universality
As has been shown in our examples, the classical scheme has a limited range of applica-
tions: There are problems with physical bounds and discrete samples (digital measure-
ments). It produces useless intervals in other cases and so far there is no general method
to eliminate nuisance parameters. Especially in Poisson processes with background and
uncertainty on the background mean there are unsolved problems. The unified approach
in the version proposed by Feldman and Cousins improves the situation of some prob-
lems but reduces the applicability of the method to others. There remains the problem
of interpretation and application: Are the classical bounds useful measures of the un-
certainty of measurements and how should we use them in error handling and testing of
parameter predictions?
The use of simple likelihood ratio intervals is subject to similar restrictions as the
classical confidence intervals. When there is no smooth likelihood function with a maxi-
mum in the physical region, the standard limits do not indicate the same precision as in
the standard case. For this reason, upper limits deduced from the likelihood ratio should
not be transformed into confidence statements. Likelihood ratio intervals are more gen-
eral than classical limits in some respects: They are able to handle a discrete sample
space and there is a logical transition from continuous parameter problems to discrete
hypothesis evaluation. They have a clear and simple interpretation, the interval is linked
to the maximum likelihood estimate and combination of errors is straight forward.
The Bayesian method is the most general approach. It is able to cope with all the
difficulties mentioned above.
6.10 Simplicity
Simplicity is an important aspect for the judgement not only for physical theories but
also for statistical methods.
While methods based on the likelihood function are fairly simple both in the con-
ception and their application, the classical approaches are complicated. This is the main
reason why the latter are not used for standard interval estimation. Hardly any physi-
cist knows the different ways to define the probability intervals. Thus, for standard
applications in physics, classical methods are mainly of academic interest.
The newly proposed unified approaches for the computation of upper limits are
even more complicated. Even specialists have difficulties to understand the details. I
am convinced that only a fraction of the authors of the recent papers on neutrino
oscillations is familiar with the underlying calculation of the limits and able to interpret
them correctly. The variety of different classical approaches to Poisson upper limits
adds to the confusion. Practical applications will in some situations require considerable
computing time. While combining results based on the likelihood function is transparent
and simple in most cases, the combination of classical limits, if possible at all, is a quite
tricky task.
7 Summary and proposed conventions
There is no common agreement on how to define the error of an estimated parameter, but
obviously we would like our error interval to include the true value with high probability,
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to be well defined, and to be as small as possible. Of course, as discussed above, there are
other features which are important when we compare different methods: A procedure
should be simple, robust, cover all standard cases and it should enable us to combine
results from different experiments. Parameter and interval estimation is used in very
different applications, such as simple few parameter estimates, upper limit computation,
unfolding and image reconstruction. It is not obvious that one single method would be
optimum for all these situations.
In the standard situation with high event numbers the likelihood can be approxi-
mated by a Gaussian and all methods give the same results within an adequate precision.
7.1 Classical procedure
The evaluation of classical approaches is problematic: There is no prescription how to
use the limits.
The essential principle of classical confidence bounds is coverage. Knowing that a
certain fraction of published measurements cover within their error limits the true pa-
rameter value is an attractive property at first sight but unfortunately it is not very
useful in practice. After all, experimental results should be used to make decisions but
even frequentists admit that classical bounds are not well suited for this purpose.
The main difficulties of the standard classical approaches are.
• Occasionally, they produce inconsistent results (see Sect. 6.2).
• Their range of applicability is restricted.
– Discrete variates can only be treated by relaxing the requirement of exact
coverage. Digital measurements cannot be treated.
– Parameters defined in a restricted region may lead to empty or unphysical
intervals.
• The results in many cases do not represent the precision of the measurement.
• The requirement of pre-experimental fixing of the whole analysis method is very
unrealistic as a general scheme and would, if followed, in many cases prevent the
scientist from extracting the full information from the data and inhibit discoveries.
• Error intervals depend on the choice of the sample variable. An exception are
one-dimensional central intervals and unified likelihood ratio ordered intervals.
• A prescription how to combine frequentist intervals from different experiments is
missing. Biasses are not discussed.
• Nuisance parameters (background with uncertainty in the mean) often cannot be
handled satisfactorily. Estimating them out produces undercoverage in some cases.
The unified classical approach provides the required coverage (approximate in the
Poisson case) but shares most of the other difficulties mentioned above and adds new
ones. It is applicable only under special conditions and it introduces artificial correlations
between independent parameters when the parameters are near physical boundaries.
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If I had to choose a frequentist method, I would select the likelihood ratio ordering for
standard problems. In situations with physical boundaries, I would follow Bouchet [39]
and ignore those. The corresponding limits would represent a reasonable documentation
of the experimental result and make the combination of experimental results easier. I
would relax the coverage requirement which is anyhow violated at many occasions, not
follow the unification concept and treat Poisson limits as exposed in [26].
7.2 Likelihood and Bayesian methods
The log-likelihood function contains the full experimental information. It measures the
relative support of different hypothesis or parameter values by the data. It fulfills tran-
sitivity, it is additive and it is invariant against transformations of the parameters or the
data. Thus it provides a sound basis for all kind of parameter and interval inferences.
Likelihood ratio limits parametrize the experimental observations in a sensible way.
They allow the combination of data, error propagation and provide a useful measure
of the uncertainty. The use of likelihood ratio errors (without integration) has some
restrictions:
• The likelihood function has to be smooth.
• Digital measurements cannot be treated.
• Likelihood ratio limits deduced from likelihood functions that are very different
from Gaussians (Upper Poisson limits) have to be interpreted with care.
A fully Bayesian treatment with a free choice of the prior parameter density is not
advisable and is not considered further. Fixing the prior density to be uniform retains
the mathematical simplicity and thus is very attractive but also has disadvantages.
• The choice of the parameter is rather arbitrary.
• It is less directly related to the data than the likelihood function.
Bayesian methods have been criticized [23], because they do not provide goodness-
of-fit tests. This is correct, but misleading in the present context. Goodness-of-fit tests
are irrelevant for parameter interval estimation which relies on a correct description of
the data by the parametrization, whereas the tests question the parametrization. Also
frequentist intervals do not depend on the quality of the fit.
7.3 Comparison
Obviously all methods have advantages and disadvantages as summarized in Table 4
where we compare the conventional classical, the unified classical, the likelihood and the
Bayesian methods with uniform and arbitrary prior densities. The distribution of the
plus and minus signs indicate the author’s personal conclusion. The attributes have to
be weighted with the importance of the evaluated property.
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Table 4. Comparison of different approaches to define error intervals, see text
method: classical unified likelihood Bayesian Bayesian
u.p. a.p.
consistency - - - - ++ + +
precision - - - + + +
universality - - - - - + ++
simplicity - - - ++ + +
variable transform. - ++ ++ - - - -
nuisance parameter - - - + +
error propagation - - + + +
combining data - - ++ + -
coverage + ++ - - - - - -
objectivity - - ++ + -
discrete hypothesis - - + + +
7.4 Proposed Conventions
There are two correlated principles which I am not ready to give up:
1. Methods have to be consistent. (see Sect. 6.2)
2. Since all relevant information for parameter inference is contained in
the likelihood function, error intervals and limits should be based on
the likelihood function only.
These principles exclude the use of classical limits.
All further conventions are debatable. I propose the following guide lines which
present my personal view and may serve as a basis for a wider discussion.
1. Whenever possible the full likelihood function should be published. It contains
the full experimental information and permits to combine the results of different
experiments in an optimum way. This is especially important when the likelihood
is strongly non-Gaussian (strongly asymmetric, cut by external bounds, has sev-
eral maxima etc.) A sensible way to present the likelihood function is to plot it in
log-scale and normalized to its maximum. A similar proposal has been made by
D’ Agostini [48]. This facilitates the reading of likelihood ratios. Also in two di-
mensions the likelihood contour plots give an instructive presentation of the data.
Isn’t the two-dimensional likelihood representation of Fig. 9 more illuminating
than drawing confidence contours supplemented by sensitivity curves?
2. Data are combined by adding the log-likelihoods. When not known, parametriza-
tion are used to approximate it.
3. If the likelihood is smooth and has a single maximum the likelihood ratio limits
should be used to define the error interval. These limits are invariant under param-
eter transformation. For the measurement of the parameter the value maximizing
the likelihood function is chosen. No correction for biassed likelihood estimators is
applied. The errors are usually asymmetric. These limits can also be interpreted
as Bayesian one standard deviation errors for the specific choice of the parameter
variable where the likelihood of the parameter has a Gaussian shape.
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4. Nuisance parameters are eliminated by integrating them out using a uniform prior.
Correlation coefficients should be computed. Alternatively, the nuisance parame-
ters are estimated out. Then it is mandatory to document their values, errors and
correlation coefficients.
5. For digital measurements the Bayesian mean and r.m.s. should be used.
6. In cases where the likelihood function is restricted by physical or mathematical
bounds and where there are no good reasons to reject a uniform prior the mea-
surement and its errors defined as the mean and r.m.s should be computed in the
Bayesian way.
7. Upper and lower limits are computed from the tails of the Bayesian probability
distributions. An even better alternative are the likelihood ratio limits. They have
the disadvantage of being less popular.
8. Non-uniform prior densities should not be used.
9. It is the scientist’s choice whether to present an error interval or a one-sided limit.
10. If measurements depending significantly on systematic errors are used to establish
new physics, conservative error estimates should be used.
11. In any case the applied procedure has to be documented.
These recipes contain no subjective element and more or less reflect our everyday
practice. An exception are Poisson limits where for strange reasons the coverage principle
- though only approximately realized - has gained preference.
Frequentists will object to these propositions. They are invited in turn to present
their solutions to the many examples presented in this article, to define precisely error
limits and to explain how to use them for error propagation, combination of results and
hypothesis exclusion. If they accept the LP, they will have to explain why the likelihood
function or its parametrization is not sufficient to compute confidence limits.
It is obvious from the discussion of the treatment of errors in the preceding section
that statistical framework is lacking. Even in the pure Bayesian approach it is not clear
whether to choose moments or probability intervals to characterize the errors. In any
case, compared to frequentist methods, likelihood based methods are better suited for
error calculations. This does not mean that classical methods in general are useless and
that only Bayesian recipes should be adopted.
For checking statistical methods, frequentist arguments may be useful. Bayesian
confidence intervals with low coverage could be suspicious but they are not necessarily
unrealistic.
An example of a bad use of the Bayesian freedom are some unfolding methods.
In some cases the regularization reduces the error below the purely statistical one and
results are obtained which are more precise than they would have been in an experiment
with no smearing where unfolding would not have been necessary.
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7.5 Summary of the summary
Frequentist intervals depends on the probability of observations which are not there and
on the choice of the probability interval in the sample space. The Bayesian approach
requires a prior density or a choice of the variable space. Only the likelihood function is
free of arbitrariness. It is the natural link between the observation and the parameter. We
have to parameterize it in a sensible way such that the resulting parameters represent
the accuracy of the measurement. If this is not possible, we should provide the full
function.
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Appendix A: A short remark on probability
In Kendall and Buckland’s Dictionary of Statistical Terms [11] we find: “probability
A basic concept which may be taken either as undefinable, expressing ‘degree of belief’,
or as the limiting frequency in an infinite random series. Both approaches have their
difficulties and the most convenient axiomatization of probability theory is a matter of
personal taste. Fortunately both lead to much the same calculus of probabilities.”
This statement is a bit too short to be of much help in concrete statistical applications
and it is not entirely correct. Let us be more explicit.
Probability must satisfy Kolmogorov’s axioms and these theorems define the calcu-
lous of probability. This is not a matter of taste.
Probability statements are based on partial information. They should include the
whole of the available information. Otherwise contradictions may result between proce-
dures using different bits of information.
The essential problem is to relate probability to the real world. We need a concept
which allows us to handle and to document in a well defined way partially uncertain
results.
Most people accept the frequency concept of probability. Assuming that an experi-
ment can be repeated under identical situations, the frequency of a certain outcome in
the limit of an infinite number of trials is the probability to be associated to the outcome.
One may question both the idea of infinite repeatability and the idea of identical condi-
tions since in reality the conditions will never be exactly the same in two experiments.
We should ignore this kind of destructive objections. We have to use idealizations. It
would be stupid to reject the theory of special relativity because it is impossible to
realize constant velocity. I see no difficulty with probabilities based on the frequency
concept.
In our every day life we have to base decisions on probabilities which we cannot relate
easily to well defined repeatable situations: Will it be raining today? Will my daughter
get sick? Will the stock values raise?
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Also in science we find difficulties to incorporate uncertainties in our knowledge into
a strict frequency concept. Are we allowed to talk about the probability that the Higgs
mass is located between 100 and 200 GeV? How likely is it that the calibration constant
of a certain device was within certain limits? Can we associate probabilities to something
that has happened in the past but is not known to us?
In the mathematical description of a deterministic world there is no substantial differ-
ence between future and past. It is quite natural to attribute probabilities to something
fixed but where we have only partial information. Probability here refers to our knowl-
edge and not to the facts. The probability that a fair coin thrown yesterday gave head
is one half.
What about constants like particle masses? Can we incorporate all probabilities in
a frequency scheme?
Well, we can imagine a huge number of worlds, all with different Higgs masses dis-
tributed according to a certain probability distribution. Similarly, we can easily imagine
that similar wether, health or economic conditions occur repeatedly. Considering differ-
ent alternative states, one of which is realized but unknown to us, with some partial
knowledge we can attribute probabilities to them. In our life we will encounter many
such situations, and we hope that the probabilities on average will correspond to the
frequencies with which we are right. I believe that probability always can be under-
stood in terms of limiting frequency. It does not matter that situations often cannot be
reproduced in reality, it is enough that it can be done in our imagination.
Is then the debate between frequentists and Bayesians about probability just a useless
academic game? The answer is No!
Bayesians associate prior probabilities to parameters which are to be measured in
an experiment and they produce updated probabilities for the parameters after the
measurement29. There, the real problem is not that we cannot define the notion of prior
probability but that we do not know its pdf. In fact, we know the prior to some extent,
we have a crude idea of it, otherwise it would be impossible to design the experiment.
But we cannot, prior to an experiment, associate to the Higgs mass a well known pdf
like we do for the lifetime of an unstable particle.
In physics, usually there is a quite clean distinction between exactly know pdfs (some-
times up to parameters) and hardly known pdfs. In sciences like biology or economics
often empirical pdfs have to be used, hence there is a continuous transition between the
two extremes. Also in our discipline, we are sometimes forced to use empirical, badly
known pdfs, for example when we discuss systematic errors or when we apply a least
square fit to observations without knowing the distribution of the fluctuations.
The inclusion of partially known pdfs considerably widens the range of applications
of statistical inference, and we should profit from the corresponding tools, but it also
introduces problems. The modern Bayesian school has tried to solve some of them. A
scheme has been developed by De Finetti and Savage to associate pdfs to the “personal
probabilities” as they are called by Savage but their method is not relevant for typical
physics situations.
When we use prior probabilities or empirical pdfs, we should state them and the
results of the analysis partially depend on the validity of our assumptions. In many
29Of course, we cannot produce a distribution of a parameter like a particle mass but a probability
distribution of the parameter. The parameter has a fixed value but our knowledge is incomplete [1].
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cases the dependence is weak.
Appendix B: Shortest classical confidence interval for a lifetime
measurement
In some cases we can find a pivotal quantity Q(X, θ) of a variate X and a parameter θ.
A pivot has a probability density which is independent of the parameter θ (like X − θ
for a Gaussian with mean θ) and consequently its probability limits Q1, Q2 of Q are also
independent of θ :
P (Q1 < Q(X, θ) < Q2) = α (20)
By solving the inequality for θ we find:
P (θ1(Q1, X) < θ < θ2(Q2, X)) = α (21)
Equation (21) relates Q1 and Q2(Q1, α). The remaining free parameter Q1 is used
to minimize |θ2 − θ1|.
We look at the example of a lifetime observation x. The width of a confidence interval
[γ1, γ2] of the decay constant γ is minimized. Here Q = γX is a pivotal quantity.
f(X) = γe−γX
Q = γX
g(Q) = e−Q
For a given confidence level α the two limits depend on each other: Q2(α,Q1). The
limits transform to limits on the parameter θ: [θ(Q1), θ(Q2)] Then |θ(Q2(α,Q1))−θ(Q1)|
is minimized:
e−Q1 − e−Q2 = α
Q2 = − ln(−α + e−Q1)
Q1 < γX < Q2 = − ln(−α + e−Q1)
Q1
X
< γ <
− ln(−α + e−Q1)
X
Minimizing the interval length is equivalent to minimizing
ln
e−Q1
−α + e−Q1
Taking into account the boundary condition Q1 > 0, we find Q1 = 0, Q2 = − ln(1 − α)
and
γ1 = 0
γ2 = − 1
X
ln(1− α)
For α = 0.6826, and an observation x = 1 we find γ1 = 0, γ2 = 1.15. (The likelihood
ratio limits are γ1 = 0.30, γ2 = 2.36)
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When we play the same game with the parameter τ = 1/γ and the same pivot we
obtain
Q′1 <
X
τ
< Q′2 = − ln(−α + e−Q
′
1)
x
− ln(−α + e−Q′1) < τ <
x
Q′1
Minimizing
1
Q′1
+
1
ln(−α + e−Q′1)
we find τ1 = 0.17 , τ2 = 2.65 (The likelihood ratio limits are invariant τ1 = 0.42, τ2 =
3.31)
The pivotal limits obviously depend, as expected, on the choice of the parameter.
Appendix C: Objective prior density for an exponential decay
In the literature we find arguments for objective priors. A nice example which illustrates
the methods used, is the derivation of the decay constant for particle decays.
Two different particles with exponential decays have the probability densities of the
decay time T and decay constant λ
f(T, λ) = f(T |λ)pi(λ)
f ′(T ′, λ′) = f(T ′|λ′)pi(λ′)
where pi(λ) is the prior density and f(T |λ) = λ exp(−λT ). The decay constants λ and λ′
are related by λ′ = αλ. This fixes α. Then for times t′ = t/α we have the transformation
f(T, λ)dTdλ = f ′(T ′, λ′)dT ′dλ′
from where we obtain
αpi(αλ) = pi(λ)
This relation is satisfied by
pi(λ) =
const.
λ
The prior density is inversely proportional to the decay constant. The flaw of the
argument is easily identified: Why should there be a universal prior density pi(λ) for
all particles? There is no reason for this assumption which was used when we tacitly
substituted pi′(λ′) with pi(λ′).
We can also argue in a slightly different way: Two physicists measure the lifetime of
the same particle in different time units, T in seconds and T ′ in minutes. The numerical
values are then related by T ′ = T/α and λ′ = αλ as above with α = 60. The prior
densities have to fulfill
pi(λ)dλ = pi′(λ′)dλ′
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Now the two physicists choose the same functional form of the prior density. Thus we
get
pi(λ)dλ = pi(λ′)dλ′
pi(λ)dλ = pi(αλ)αdλ
pi(λ) =
const.
λ
(22)
The resulting prior densities are not normalizable, a fact which already indicates
that the result cannot be correct. Again there is no compelling reason why pi should be
equal to pi′. It is also easily seen that prior densities different from (22) do not lead to
contradictions. For example a uniform prior in the interval 0 < T < 1 sec would produce
pi(T ) = 1 and pi′(T ′) = 1/60.
Similar plausibility arguments as used above are applied for the derivation of the a
prior density for the Poisson parameter. They are in no way convincing.
It is impossible to determine prior densities from scaling laws or symmetries alone.
We can use non-uniform prior densities when they are explicitly given as in Example
19.
References
1. E. T. Jaynes, Bayesian Methods: General Background. An Introductory Tutorial.
Maximum Entropy and Bayesian Methods in Applied Statistics, ed. J. H. Justice,
Cambridge University Press (1984) 1.
2. R. A. Fisher, Statistical Methods, Experimental Design and Scientific Inference,
Oxford University Press (1990) 1 (first published in 1925).
3. M. G. Kendall and A. Stuart, The Advanced Theory of Statistics, Vol. 2, Griffin,
(1979).
4. I. J. Good, Good Thinking, The Foundations of Probability and Its Applications,
Univ. of Minnesota Press (1983).
G. E. P. Box and G. C. Tiao, Bayesian Inference in Statistical Analysis, Addison-
Weseley (1973).
B. P. Roe, Probability and Statistics in Experimental Physics, Springer (1992).
5. H. Jeffreys, Theory of Probability, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1961).
6. B. Efron, Why isn’t Everyone a Bayesian? Am. Stat. 40 (1986) 1.
D. V. Lindley, Wald Lectures: Bayesian Statistics (with discussion), Statistical Sci-
ence, 5 (1990) 44.
G. D’Agostini, Bayesian Reasoning versus Conventional Statistics in High Energy
Physics, presented at XVIII International Workshop on Maximum Entropy and
Bayesian Methods, Garching, Preprint physics/9811046 (1998).
7. R. D. Cousins, Why Isn’t Every Physicist a Bayesian? Am. J. Phys. 63 (1995) 398.
8. J. Neyman, Outline of a Theory of Statistical Estimation Based on the Classical
Theory of Probability, Phil. Trans. A236 (1937) 333.
9. G. J. Feldman, R. D. Cousins, Unified approach to the classical statistical analysis
of small signals. Phys. Rev. D 57 (1998) 3873.
10. G. Zech, Objections to the unified approach to the computation of classical confi-
dence limits, physics/9809035 (1998).
Frequentist and Bayesian confidence intervals 76
G. Zech, Confronting Classical and Bayesian Confidence Limits to Examples, pre-
sented at the Workshop on Confidence Limits, held at CERN, CERN 2000-005,
(2000) 141.
11. M. G. Kendall and W. R. Buckland, A dictionary of statistical terms, Longman
(1982)
12. C. Caso et al., Review of particle physics, EPJ C 3 (1998).
13. T. A. Bancroft and Chien-Pai Han, Statistical theory and inference in research, ed.
D. B. Owen, Dekker, (1981)
14. M. G. Kendall and A. Stuart, The Advanced Theory of Statistics, Vol. 2, page 128,
Griffin, (1979).
15. M. G. Kendall and A. Stuart, The Advanced Theory of Statistics, Vol. 2, page 240,
Griffin, (1979).
16. E. L. Lehmann, Testing Statistical Hypothesis, Wiley (1959).
17. G. J. Feldman, talk given at the Workshop on Confidence Limits, held at FNAL
(2000), unpublished.
18. H. L. Harter, Criteria for best substitute interval estimators, with application to the
normal distribution, J. Amer. Statist. Ass. 59, (1964) 1133.
19. J. O. Berger and R. L. Wolpert, The Likelihood Principle, Lecture Notes of Inst. of
Math. Stat., page 9, ed. S. S. Gupta, Hayward, Ca, ( (1984).
W. James and C. Stein, Estimation with quadratic loss, Forth Berkeley Symposium
Math. Statist. and Prob. University of California Press, Berkeley (1961) 361.
P. Clifford, Interval estimation as viewed from the world of mathematical statistics,
contribution to the Workshop on Confidence Limits, held at CERN, CERN 2000-005
(2000) 157.
20. D. Basu, Statistical Information and Likelihood, Lecture Notes in Statistics, page
114, ed. J. K. Ghosh, Springer (1988).
21. A. W. F. Edwards, Likelihood, page 114, The John Hopkins University Press (1992).
22. J. D. Kalbfleisch and D. A. Sprott, Applications of likelihood methods to models
involving large numbers of parameters, J. Roy. Statist. Soc. B 32 (1970) 175.
23. R. D. Cousins, Comments on methods for setting confidence limits, contribution to
the Workshop on Confidence Limits, held at CERN, CERN 2000-005 (2000) 49.
24. G. J. Feldman, in the Pannel Discussion of Workshop on Confidence Limits, held
at CERN, CERN 2000-005 (2000) 280.
25. L. J. Savage et al., The Foundation of Statistical Inference, Methuen, London (1962).
26. G. Zech, Upper limits in experiments with background or measurement errors, Nucl.
Instr. and Meth. A277 (1989) 608.
27. A. L. Read, Optimal statistical analysis of search results based on the likelihood
ratio and its application to the search for the MSM Higgs boson at
√
s = 161 and
172 GeV, DELPHI 97-158 PHYS 737 (1997).
28. K. K. Gan et al., Incorporation of the statistical uncertainty in the background
estimate into the upper limit on the signal., Nucl. Instr. and Meth. A412 (1998)
475.
29. A. L. Read, Modified frequentist analysis of search results (The CLs method), con-
tribution to the Workshop on Confidence Limits, held at CERN, CERN 2000-005
(2000) 81.
30. J. Conway, Setting limits and making discoveries in CDF, contribution to the Work-
shop on Confidence Limits, held at CERN, CERN 2000-005 (2000) 247.
Frequentist and Bayesian confidence intervals 77
31. V. L. Highland, Comments on “Upper limits in experiments with background or
measurement errors”, Nucl. Instr. and Meth. A398 (1997) 429.
32. G. Zech, Reply to ’Comments on “Upper limits in experiments with background or
measurement errors” ’, Nucl. Instr. and Meth. A398 (1997) 431.
33. R. D. Cousins, Additional Comments on Methods for Setting Confidence Limits,
Contribution to Workshop on Confidence Limits, held at FNAL (2000), unpublished.
34. W. H. Jeffreys and J. O. Berger, Ockham’s Razor and Bayesian Analysis, American
Scientist 80 (1992) 64.
35. J. Kleinfeller et al., KARMEN 2: A new precision in the search for neutrino oscilla-
tions, Proc. of the 29th Int. Conf. on High Energy Phys., Vancouver (1998).
36. L. Baudis et al., Limits on the Majorana neutrino mass in the 0.1 eV range, hep-
ex/9902014 (1999).
37. M. G. Kendall and A. Stuart, The Advanced Theory of Statistics, Vol. 2, page 235,
Griffin, (1979).
38. G. Punzi, A stronger classical definition of confidence limits, hep-ex/9912048, and
contribution , to the Workshop on Confidence Limits, held at CERN, CERN 2000-
005, (2000) 207.
39. J. Bouchez, Confidence belts on bounded parameters, hep-ex/0001036 (2000).
40. M. G. Kendall and A. Stuart, The Advanced Theory of Statistics, Vol. 2, page 167,
Griffin, (1979).
41. C. Giunti, A new ordering principle for the classical statistical analysis of Poisson
processes with background, Phys. Rev D 59 , 053001 (1999).
42. B. P. Roe and M. B. Woodroofe, Improved probability method for estimating signal
in the presence of background, Phys. Rev. D 60, 053009 (1999).
43. B. P. Roe and M. B. Woodroofe, Setting Confidence Belts, hep-ex/0007048 (2000).
44. M. Mandelkern and J. Schultz, The Statistical Analysis of Gaussian and Poisson
Signals Near Physical Boundaries, J. Math. Phys. 41, 5701 (2000), hep-ex/9910041
(2000).
45. S. Ciampolillo, Small signal with background: Objective confidence intervals and
regions for physical parameters from the principle of maximum likelihood, Nuovo
Cim.ento A 111 (1998) 1415.
46. H. Jeffreys, Further significance tests, Proc. Roy. Soc. A146 (1936) 416.
47. I. Hacking, Logic of Statistical Inference, page 49, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge (1965).
48. G. D’Agostini, Confidence limits: What is the Problem? Is there the Solution, con-
tribution to the Workshop on Confidence Limits, held at CERN, CERN 2000-005
(2000) 3.
49. E. T. Jaynes, Prior Probabilities, IEEE Trans. Solid-State Circuits SC 4 (1968) 227
50. G. D’Agostini, Jeffreys Priors versus Experienced Physicist Priors. Arguments
against Objective Bayesian Theory, Contribution to 6th Valencia International
Meeting on Bayesian Statistics, Alcossebre, Preprint physics/9811045 (1998)
51. H. B. Prosper, Small-signal analysis in high-energy physics: A Bayesian approach,
Phys. Rev. D 37 (1988) 1153.
D. A. Williams, Comment on “Small-signal analysis in high-energy physics: A
Bayesian approach”, Phys. Rev. D 38 (1988) 3582.
52. J. O. Berger and R. L. Wolpert, The Likelihood Principle, Lecture Notes of Inst. of
Math. Stat., Hayward, Ca, ed. S. S. Gupta (1984).
Frequentist and Bayesian confidence intervals 78
53. D. Basu, Statistical Information and Likelihood, Lecture Notes in Statistics, ed. J.K.
Ghosh, Springer-Verlag NY (1988).
54. R. A. Fisher, Theory of statistical estimation. Proc. Comb. Phil. Soc. 22, 700-725,
reprint in Contribution to Mathematical Statistics, New York, Wiley.(1950).
55. J. B. Kalbfleisch, Sufficiency and conditionality, Biometrika 62 (1975) 251.
56. G. A. Barnard, G. M. Jenkins and C. B. Winsten, Likelihood inference and time
series, J. Roy. Statist. Soc. A125 (1962) 32.
57. G. A. Barnard and V. P. Godambe, Memorial Article, Allan Birnbaum 1923 - 1976,
Ann. of Stat. 10 (1982) 1033.
58. A. Birnbaum, More on concepts of statistical evidence, J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 67
(1972) 858.
59. W. Edwards, H. Lindman, L. J. Savage, Bayesian statistical inference for psycho-
logical reasearch, Psychological Review 70 (1963) 193.
60. D. Basu, Statistical Information and Likelihood, Lecture Notes in Statistics, page
67, ed. J.K. Ghosh, Springer-Verlag NY (1988).
61. L. G. Savage, The Foundations of Statistics Reconsidered, Proceedings of the forth
Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability, ed. J. Neyman
(1961) 575.
62. C. Stein, A remark on the likelihood principle, J. Roy. Statist. Soc. A 125 (1962)
565.
63. M. Stone, Strong inconsistency from uniform priors, J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 71,
(1976) 114.
64. B. Hill, On some statistical paradoxes and non-conglomerability. In Bayesian Statis-
tics, ed. J. M. Bernardo, M. H. DeGroot, D. V. Lindley. and A. F. M. Smith, Uni-
versity Press, Valencia. (1981).
65. I. J. Good, Some logic and history of hypothesis testing, ed. J. Pitt, Philosophy in
Economics, Reidel, Dordrecht (1981).
66. G. Zech, Comparing statistical data to Monte Carlo simulation - parameter fitting
and unfolding, Desy 95-113 (1995).
67. D. Basu, On the relevance of randomization in data analysis, Survey Sampling and
measurement, ed. N. K. Namboodiri, Academic Press, New York (1978).
68. M. G. Kendall and A. Stuart, The Advanced Theory of Statistics, Vol. 2, page 653,
Griffin, (1979).
69. I. Narsky, Estimation of Upper Limits Using a Poisson Statistic, hep-ex/9904025
(1999).
70. J. O. Berger and D. A. Berry, Statistical Analysis and the Illusion of Objectivity,
American Scientist 76 (1988) 159.
71. Diaconis and Freedman, On inconsistent Bayes estimates of location, Anals of
Statistics 14 (1986) 68.
72. J. Kiefer, Conditional Confidence Statements and Confidence Estimation, J. Amer.
Statist. Assoc. 72 (1977) 789.
73. Bureau International de Poids et Mesures, Rapport du Groupe de travail sur
l’expression des incertitudes, P.V. du CIPM (1981) 49.
P. Giacomo, On the expression of uncertainties, in Quantum Metrology and Funda-
mental Physical Constants, ed. P. H. Cutler and A. A. Lucas, Plenum Press (1983).
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), Guide to the expression of
uncertainty in measurement, Geneva (1993).
Frequentist and Bayesian confidence intervals 79
74. P. Janot and F. Le Diberder, Combining “Limits”, CERN-PPE/97-53 (1997).
LEP working group for Higgs boson searches, P. Bock et al., Lower bound for the
SM Higgs boson mass: combined result from four LEP experiments, CERN/LEPC
97-11 (1997).
T. Junk, Confidence Level Computation for Combining Searches with Small Statis-
tics, hep-ex/9902006 (1999).
75. C. Caso et al., Review of particle physics, EPJ C 3 (2000).
-2 -1 0 1 2
103
104
-2 -1 0 1 2
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
 
 
nu
m
be
r o
f e
ve
nt
s
xbar
 
 
lik
el
ih
oo
d 
ra
tio
xbar
